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The Reagan Administration's
Habeas Corpus Proposals
Larry W. Yackle*
"Democracy," said Churchill, "means that if the door bell rings in
the early hours, it is likely to be the milkman."' He might have added
that if the caller is not the milkman, but a police officer, Anglo-American
democracy contemplates that the writ of habeas corpus will be available
to the citizen awakened and dragged off into the darkness. The Great
Writ has no substantive content of its own but provides the machinery
for putting claims before state and federal courts-for translating substantive principles of liberty into effective law. The writ is process, but more
than process. It is the means by which liberty is maintained in the most
basic sense. "Its root principle," in the words of the Supreme Court, "is
that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the
judiciary for a man's imprisonment. "2
The essential office of the writ as a weapon against unwarranted executive detention prior to trial is assured. No one disputes the availability
of the writ in contending with the midnight knock at the door. There is,
however, considerable debate over the availability of the writ after trialthe exemption of the prisoner's claims from ordinary preclusion rules.
Collateral review of criminal convictions by way of postconviction habeas
"is, and always has been, a controversial and emotion-ridden subject.' '3
The lower federal courts sitting in habeas have the authority effectively
to set state criminal convictions at naught by finding detention under them
invalid. In the estimate of some, "[t]here is an affront to state sensibilities
when a single federal judge can order discharge of a prisoner whose conviction has been affirmed by the highest court of a state." ' 4 In most
instances, of course, state authorities may bring the prisoner to trial again
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, University of
Kansas; LL.M. 1974, Harvard University. Work on this Article was supported by the
University of Alabama Research Grants Committee, Project #1155. Readers should know
that I consulted with counsel for the prisoners in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982),
one of the decisions discussed in this Article. My participation was marginal. I tend to
think that I was the principal beneficiary of my conversations and correspondence with
Messrs. Richard L. Aynes andJ. Dean Carro of the Appellate Review Office at the University of Akron School of Law. I also attempted, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Solicitor
General's Office to relax what I considered to be a rigid approach in the government's
amicus brief in Isaac.
1. H. THOMAS, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD 388 (1979). See Perry, Interpretivism,
Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 261 n.2 (1981).
2. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963).
3. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 246 (3d ed. 1976).
4. Id.
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and obtain a conviction consistent with federal law. 5 Nevertheless, closer
attention to federal claims is purchased at a price: friction between state
and federal6 courts and disruption in the ordinary finality of criminal
judgments.
Years ago, the jurisdiction of the lower federal ccurts to examine state
criminal judgments in postconviction habeas corpus generated considerable
political heat. Articles and reports were written, arguments were made,
and positions were taken. After the debate, in the Congress and elsewhere,
the result was clear. Habeas corpus review was recognized as a desirable
7
and effective part of the structure of criminal justice in the United States.
Some state interests were, to be sure, subordinated to the greater national
interest in the enforcement of federal rights. Ways were found, however,
to acknowledge and respect state prerogatives and to avoid unnecessary
friction. Amendments to the habeas statutes in 1948 and 1966,8 together
with a line of restrictive Supreme Court decisions, 9 satisfied any remaining state concerns. 10 In 1976, the Supreme Court promulgated and Congress approved two sets of procedural rules to streamline postconviction
litigation. I"Nevertheless, hostility to the very existence of the postconviction writ survives intact. Once again, there are bills in the hopper. In
12
point of fact, there are several.
5. Compare Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977) (awarding habeas relief),
with State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 271 (Iowa 1979) (affirming a conviction after
remand).
6. I have collected cases and materials regarding collateral challenges to criminal
convictions in a book on the subject. L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES (1981
& Supp. 1982). Readers who wish to see primary and secondary authorities on various
problems discussed in this Article may find them there. In order to conserve space in
what follows, I will often take the short-cut of citing to the book rather than the authorities
upon which the book relies. While there are drawbacks to this course, I tend to think
that both neophytes and habeas buffs will appreciate, in the end, the consequent escape
from standard references and string citations.
7. See id § 19, at 92 (1981).
8. See id § 19, 58 (1981).
9. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), discussed at notes 170-207 infra; Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), discussed at notes 75-95 infra.
10. See Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 347 (9th Cir. 1982) (surveying these
developments in another context).
11. H.R. REP. No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). These rules are codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
12. Several bills introduced recently proposed important changes in current habeas
corpus law, albeit without the Reagan Administration's express support. I will refer to
them on occasion. See, e.g., S. 653, 97th Cong., lst Sess. (1981); H.R. 5679, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3416, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 134, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981). 1 intend in this Article, however, to address myself primarily to proposals
originally introduced via S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), in the Senate and H.R.
6050, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), in the House of Representatives. Most activity was
centered in the Senate, where Senator Thurmond was the chief sponsor. He introduced
S. 2216 on March 16, 1982, and hearings were held on April 1, 1982. A few weeks later,
Senator Thurmond introduced essentially the same program by way of a new bill. S. 2838,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See 128 Cong. Rec. S10553 (daily ed. August 16, 1982).
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The most important bill comes from the Reagan Administration. No
more dramatic proposals have been offered since former President Nixon
3
attempted to exchange grudging acquiescence in the Speedy Trial Act
for sharp restrictions on the availability of collateral review.' 4 Early in
his Administration, President Reagan announced the appointment of an
Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, charged to study criminal
justice issues and to make recommendations for needed change.' 5 The
Task Force surfaced within a few months and proposed a range of measures,
including amendments to the habeas corpus statutes.' 6 No one would
seriously suggest, of course, that the intractable social problems surrounding criminal violence can be addressed by changing the federal statutes
governing postconviction review of state court judgments. The Task Force
Report was, accordingly, an unlikely vehicle for the presentation of the
Reagan Administration's habeas proposals. After a brief life in the press,
the Report dropped from sight. In its place, the Administration put for-

A few weeks later still, Thurmond captured the same package in S. 2903, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982), which repeated the Administration's habeas corpus proposals and, in
addition, carried to the Congress President Reagan's views regarding the insanity defense.
S. 2903 was placed directly on the Senate Calendar and could have been considered during the lame duck session near the end of 1982. That did not happen and, of course,
all pending bills died with the Congress. The Administration has not, however, abandoned
hope that its habeas proposals will be adopted. Senator Thurmond has introduced the
Reagan program yet again in the 98th Congress. S. 217, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
See 129 Cong. Rec. S401 (daily ed. January 27, 1983).
13. 18 U.S.C. §5 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
14. See Hearingson S. 895 Before the Subcommittee on ConstitutionalRights of the SenateJudiciay
Committee, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 93-121 (1971) (including the testimony of then-Assistant
Attorney General Rehnquist).
15. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT at v
(1981).
16. Id. at xii. The Task Force proposals regarding habeas corpus were collected in
Recommendation 42:
The Attorney General should support or propose legislation that would:
a. Require, where evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus cases are necessary
in the judgment of the district court, that the district court afford the opportunity to the appropriate state court to hold the evidentiary hearing.
b. Prevent federal district courts from holding evidentiary hearings on facts
which were fully expounded and found in the state court proceeding.
c. Impose a 3-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions. The 3-year
period would commence on the latest of the following dates:
(1) the date the state court judgment became final,
(2) the date of pronouncement of a federal right which had not existed at the
time of trial and which had been determined to be retroactive, or
(3) the date of discovery of new evidence by the petitioner which lays the
factual predicate for assertion of a federal right.
d. Codify existing case law barring litigation of issues not properly raised in
state court unless "cause and prejudice" is shown, and provide a statutory definition for "cause."
Id. I have commented on some of these ideas previously. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6,
§§ 19, 124, 138.
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ward a document dearly setting forth its proposals to "reform habeas corpus
procedures." 17 The Habeas Corpus Reform Act departs in some respects
from the Task Force recommendations and tracks in certain respects the
proposals in other parallel measures. If enacted, the Reform Act would
undercut the long-standing place of postconviction habeas in the structure of American criminal justice. It therefore is entitled to the most serious
examination.
I find the Reagan Administration's proposals objectionable on all
counts and, frankly, consider them to reflect disappointment over battles
lost in the 1940's. Fundamental, ideological hostility to the writ is plainly
embraced by a new generation of critics. It is not enough simply to condemn their effort by pointing to the past. New voices have been raised
against the writ, and they must be answered, with attention to the merits
of an ancient controversy. That is what I hope to accomplish in this Article. I will attempt, first, to demonstrate that the Administration's proposals are based on old arguments, long since refuted.' 8 Then, I will critique
the proposed legislation, focusing on the scope of habeas review, 19 the
20
distribution of fact-finding responsibility between state and federal courts,
2 1
and the effect to be given state procedural grounds of decision. Along
the way, I will contrast the Administration's proposals to the framework
established under present law. 22 If I accomplish nothing else in these pages,
I want to dispel the myth that the Reagan program would only write into
statute form innovations already made by the Burger Court.
17. See generally The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the Comm.
on theJudiciaty, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as Reform Act].
18. See text accompanying notes 23-66 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 67-95 infra.
20. See text accompanying notes 96-115 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 116-261 infra.
22. In this Article I will focus primarily on the Administration's major proposals. There
are, however, other proposed changes. The proposal to establish a one-year statute of
limitations in habeas cases, see S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1982), reprintedin Reform
Act, supra note 17, at 9, 10; Reform Act, supra note 17, at 75-78 (section-by-section analysis
of U.S. Dep't ofJustice), and a two-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976)
proceedings, S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1982), reprintedin Reform Act, supra note
17, at 9, 15; Reform Act, supra note 17, at 102 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't
of Justice), is perhaps the dearest evidence that the Administration does not understand
and appreciate the present system of postconviction review. Nor will the three-year statute
of limitations originally proposed by the Attorney General's Task Force. see note 16 supra,
withstand reflection. Rule 9(a) of the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) Rules, effective since 1977,
already authorizes summary dismissal of postconviction habeas petitions if the respondent demonstrates prejudice due to unreasonable delay and the petitioner fails to show
that the petition asserts claims that could not have been raised before the circumstances
prejudicial to the respondent arose.
The proposed shift from this framework to a statute of limitations is unjustified and
unjustifiable. First, the challenge in habeas is to detention simpliciturand not to a prisoner's
conviction. A statute of limitations tied to the date ofjudgment is, accordingly, theoretically
unsound. Second, it is in the nature of collateral claims that they come to litigants' attention well after judgment. Time is required thereafter to define federal issues precisely,
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I.

THF IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE REAGAN PROGRAM

The Reagan Administration's habeas corpus proposals were first
placed before the Congress under a cover letter from Attorney General
to marshal all available arguments, and to file a well-drafted petition. Moreover, habeas
litigation is typically carried on by undereducated prison inmates proceeding pro se. They
cannot be expected to act with the dispatch that might reasonably be demanded of professional advocates. See generally P. ROBINSON, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE COURT JUDGMENTS (1979).

I recognize, of course, that the Administration would attempt, at least, to avoid conflict with the exhaustion doctrine, which requires habeas applicants to bring their federal
claims in the state courts before bringing them in the federal forum. Other bills take no
account of the time consumed in exhaustion and would, it seems, place some petitioners
in the untenable position of contending with two statutory prescriptions, both of which
cannot be met. E.g., S. 653, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The Administration's proposal
recognizes that prisoners cannot control the pace of state court decisionmaking. The oneyear time period runs, accordingly, from the time at which state remedies are exhausted.
That precise time, however, may be difficult to pinpoint. The successful exhaustion of state
remedies is a legal question not routinely answerable short of decision in federal court.
Hypotheticals can be constructed in which the application of a statute of limitations
geared to that judgment may lead to unfair results. What is the result, for example, when
a prisoner, who satisfies the exhaustion doctrine by bringing a purely legal question to
the state's highest court on direct review, mistakenly believes it necessary also to pursue
state collateral relief thereafter and then spends sufficient time in state postconviction proceedings to arrive in federal court more than a year after the original appellate decision?
Cutting back the other way, what is the result when a prisoner, who mistakenly believes
that direct review has satisfied the exhaustion doctrine with respect to a fact-oriented claim,
spends nearly a year preparing a federal petition, files for federal relief on the last possible
day, and then learns that the exhaustion doctrine has not yet been met? If the prisoner
returns to state court, will another limitation period begin to run when the highest state
court denies relief on review of state collateral proceedings? If so, does it follow that prisoners
in any case can generate an additional period whenever they like, simply by applying
to the state courts for another rebuff? As long as they are careful never to permit more
than a year to elapse between courts? TheJustice Department's lawyers may have answers
to these questions and others, but I dare say it will take litigation to make those answers stick.
Further subsections create, in the language of the commentary, certain "exceptions"
to the "general rule" that the one-year period begins to run at the time state remedies
are exhausted. These "exceptions" roughly parallel the circumstances, identified in other
proposed amendments to § 2244, that justify a finding of "cause" for procedural default.
See text accompanying note 119 infra. Far greater clarity is demanded regarding the precise
date on which an extraordinarily short limitations period begins to run. We can expect
more confusion than we can afford, for example, in cases in which proposed § 2(e)(3)
controls, and the federal habeas courts must ascertain the date on which a federal right
was "initially recognized." See S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1982), reprintedin Reform
Act, supra note 17, at 9, 10. The commentary that accompanied the Administration's
original program did not specify whether an unambiguous decision by the Supreme Court
would be necessary before a claim could be said to have been "recognized," or whether,
at the other extreme, it would be enough if lawyers in a district court a continent away
had made the argument in their briefs in another case. See Reform Act, supra note 17,
at 19-20 (statement of Hon. Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Policy, U.S. Dep't ofJustice). More recent editions of the Administration's position put
it squarely that the claim must have been "recognized" by the*Supreme Court itself.
E.g., S. 217, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 2903, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). That
change is insufficient in itself. Litigants and judges alike would have difficulty determin-
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William French Smith.2 3 The Reagan Administration, Smith maintains,
"is firmly committed to the enforcement and protection of federal rights
24
including the federal rights of criminal defendants in state proceedings."
The Administration believes, "however, that there is no justification in
the present day for the availability of federal habeas corpus as a routine
means of review of state criminal convictions.' '25 Postconviction habeas
should instead be a "backstop or fail-safe mechanism to guard against
the rare instances in which state courts may have acted in defiance or
disregard of federal law.'"26 Three reasons are given for abandoning the
present scheme. First, Smith contends that in recent years the states have
established state collateral remedies through which prisoners may raise
federal claims after trial and appellate review.2

7

The availability of state

postconviction procedures, it is argued, makes federal habeas corpus all
the more unnecessary. 8 Second, Smith suggests that current habeas corpus
practice pays too little respect to the "integrity of state procedures" for
which habeas corpus should have "scrupulous regard." 29 Finally, Smith
insists that the state courts are competent to adjudicate federal claims and
are receptive to them. Indeed, state courts are "trustworthy expositors
' 30
of federal law."
These arguments will be considered in turn. It is true that most states
have established postconviction remedies in the nature of habeas corpus
or coram nobis. 3 1 In many instances, however, those remedies are attended
ing whether the Supreme Court had "recognized" a claim. Only rarely are the Court's
precedents "on all fours" with the case at bar, admitting no basis for distinction. See note
259 infra. Greater exactitude is necessary if a statute of limitations is to be workable.
I recognize the difficulty that the Administration faces. The ambiguity built into this
bill stems largely from attempts to mitigate the severity of a statute triggered by, for example,
the date of the criminal judgment under attack. That the draftsmen have been unsuccessful in writing a bill that can work and work fairly only underscores the futility of the
attempt to introduce such a statute in the first instance. The increased finality of criminal
judgments sought by the Administration cannot be achieved by this means. There is simply
no need for, and much reason to resist, a rigid rule that cuts off federal claims without
asking why they were not presented sooner or how the delay has added to the respondent's burdens. Indeed, it was to contend with the various interests at stake in habeas
cases that the more flexible framework under Rule 9(a) was established.
23. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 45-48 (letter from William French Smith, U.S. Attorney Gen., to George Bush, President of the Senate (March 3, 1982); an identical submission was made to Speaker O'Neill on the same day).
24. Id. at 45.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28, &e id.; cf Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381-84 (1977) (holding that the postconviction remedy available in District of Columbia is sufficient to protect federal rights of
applicants for collateral relief and that federal habeas corpus review is not generally
available).
29. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 45 (letter from William French Smith, U.S. Attorney Gen., to George Bush, President of the Senate (Mar. 3, 1982)).
30. Id.
31. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, ch. 1; see also STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN-
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by the same procedural snarls that frustrate direct review. Claims that
might have been, but were not, raised at trial, for example, are often
forfeited in state collateral proceedings in the same way that they are
forfeited on appeal from the criminal conviction.3 2 The result is the appearance, but not the substance, of genuine state court opportunities for
litigating federal claims collaterally. 33
It is not true that the present framework for federal habeas review
disrespects state procedures. The federal habeas courts are at pains to
recognize legitimate state interests in the efficient processing of criminal
cases. When the federal habeas courts decline to give effect to state procedural grounds of decision, it is usually to reach behind the miscues of
counsel.3 4 It is widely acknowledged that most procedural defaults in
criminal proceedings can be ascribed to defense counsel. 3 5 If prisoners
are bound by what their attorneys did, or failed to do, on their behalf,
any examination of federal claims must be filtered through allegations that
counsel rendered ineffective assistance.3 6 Federal habeas courts are able
to cut through any confusion over counsel's mistakes and adjudicate underlying claims without simultaneously finding a sixth amendment violation.3 7
It might be preferable to address the matter forthrightly, in hopes of improving the quality of justice at the trial stage. The prospects for success on
such a venture are, however, less than bright. Federal habeas corpus provides a short-fall guarantee against saddling blameless defendants with
the consequences of counsel's inadequacies. 38
Nor is it true that federal claims may safely be left to the state courts,
without federal supervision. Attorney General Smith neglects both history
and present reality. Congress did not authorize the federal courts to issue
the writ in behalf of state prisoners until 1867, when there was reason
to doubt that state courts in the South could be trusted to enforce the
post-Civil War amendments. 39 Even so, the federal courts apparently did
ISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES §§

UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT

§§

1, 2 (1980),

1.1-6.3 (1968);

11 U.L.A. 137 (Supp.

1983).
32. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 63, at 269.
33. See id.
34. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 20, at 97-98 (1981).
35. See text accompanying note 195 infra; cf. Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1973).
36. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representationas a GroundforPost-Conviction Relief
in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289, 290-91 (1964).
37. L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 20, at 97-98 (1981).
38. See Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in CriminalCases: Departuresfrom Habeas
Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927, 959-70 (1973); cf Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Stud),
in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REV. 321, 331 (1973) (Table II, listing grounds for attacking conviction).
39. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 26, 14 Stat. 385 (1867). I lay to one side arguments
that the Constitution of its own force establishes the authority of the federal courts to
issue the writ on behalf of prisoners attacking allegedly invalid state custody. See L.
YACKLE, supra note 6, § 17.
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not begin to grant habeas relief after judgment until much later, perhaps
as late as Brown v. Allen. 40 By then, the Supreme Court had launched a
campaign to restructure state criminal process on the federal model, as
described in the Bill of Rights. 41 Once again, there was concern that the
state courts would prove recalcitrant.4 2 Accordingly, the Court recruited
the federal habeas courts to ensure that the state courts complied with
new, and unpopular, federal doctrines. 43 The current system of postconviction review reflects, then, historical attempts to coerce the state courts
into accepting federal doctrinal innovations to which they did not
subscribe.44

The need for federal habeas has not subsided. State judges, who must
stand periodic election or answer to the public under some version of the
Missouri Plan, 45 cannot be as zealous in the protection of constitutional
rights as life-tenured federal judges, who view federal claims in isolation
from the inevitable attention in state court upon the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. 46 State judges act at their peril when they subordinate
societal interests in convicting the guilty to the defendant's interest in procedural safeguards.4 7 Even if state judges were able to withstand public
scrutiny and sustain meritorious constitutional claims, they would inevitably
arrive at inconsistent, albeit good-faith, judgments. Because the Supreme
40. 344 U.S. 443, 459-60 (1953). For a historical overview of the case-law development of habeas relief, see generally Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 478-507 (1963), and Developments in the
Law-FcderalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1045-62 (1970). More recently, Professor Peller has reread the older habeas cases and has questioned Bator's analysis. See
Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579,
661-63 (1982) (arguing that the federal courts had reexamined state judgments well before
Brown).
41. Cf United States ex rel. Jones v. Franzen, 676 F.2d 261,268 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,
J., concurring) (arguing that Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions were part of
that Court's larger attempt to root out race discrimination against blacks, who form
disproportionate share of criminal defendant population). See generally Friendly, The Bill
of Rights as a Code of CriminalProcedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965); Pye, The Warren
Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249 (1968).
42. See Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA.
L, REv. 286, 290-91 (1966).
43. See Address by Judge Oliver, Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, in San Francisco, California (July 18, 1968) (remarking on poor record of state courts), reprinted in
45 F.R.D. 199, 221-25 (1968).
44. See generally L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 20, at 96-97 (1981).
45. See S. CARBON & L. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 11-13 (1980).

46. Cf Note, FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 78, 104 (1964) (federal habeas courts isolated from state procedural barriers to
the consideration of federal claims).
47. Cf S. CARBON & L. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 35-36 (1980) (reporting that controversial decisions often influence subsequent
campaigns). But see Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 383 (1977) (rejecting the argument
chat only life-tenured judges can determine federal rights authoritatively).
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Court is physically unable to reconcile conflicting decisions from dozens
of local jurisdictions, it would still fall to the federal habeas courts to achieve
some measure of regional consistency. Within the present scheme, the
Supreme Court enforces national uniformity by accepting habeas appeals
from the twelve federal circuits. Finally, federal relitigation in habeas offers
identifiable advantages over the original proceedings in state court. Federal
habeas courts are able to address claims based on allegations outside the
record.4 8 They can develop the record in order to facilitate Supreme Court
review. 49 Habeas courts can determine the retrospective application of new
constitutional doctrine, 50 and they can engage the state courts in a dialogue
regarding the proper approach to constitutional problems, thereby con51
tributing in the long run to a better brand of analysis.
Attorney General Smith's last argument bleeds into something more
ideological. He joins ranks with critics of postconviction habeas, who value
greatly the ascertainment of guilt in criminal cases and place comparatively
less emphasis on the observance of procedural safeguards. 5 2 Accordingly,
he tends to view adjudication in state court as sufficient in virtually all
cases. The benefits of collateral review in habeas are, on this analysis,
more than offset by the expense of postconviction litigation, the low percentage of successful claims, the "affront to state sensibilities," and the threat
to the finality of judgments.5 3 While Smith maintains that the Reagan

48. See Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1113

(1970).
49. Remarks by Paul A. Freund, 9 UTAH L. REV. 27, 28 (1965).
50. See Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ,
and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 77-92 (1965); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719,
747-57 (1966).
51. See Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE
L.J. 1035, 1048-49 (1977).
52. Habeas Corpus Procedures Amendments Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 653 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1981) (statement of Sen. Chiles) (arguing
for more respect for state courts and insisting that "[a]n effective criminal justice system
must let would-be criminals know that they will be punished for committing crimes");
id. at 42 (statement of Fla. Attorney Gen. Smith) (insisting that "swift and sure punishment is the essential deterrent of the criminal law" and arguing that if "finality" cannot
be restored to state court judgments, "we cannot expect to protect society from criminal
offenders"); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 142, 146-51 (1970).
53. Justice Jackson stated the argument of economy early: "It must prejudice the
occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must
search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not
worth the search." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See Becker & Stewart, PrisonerPetition Processing in the Federal Courts by Use of Pattern Forms,
ParajudicialPersonnel, and Computers, 20 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 579-80 (1972); Desmond,
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 50 GEO. L.J. 755, 755-56 (1962);
cf. Note, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitionsfrom State Prisoners, 52 VA. L. REV.
486, 495-97 (1966) (arguing that the burden is principally psychological). Compare Chief
Justice BurgerIssues Year-end Report, 62 A.B.A. J. 189, 190 (1976) (complaining that prisoners'
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Administration's proposals "rest primarily on considerations of federalism
and appropriate recognition of the dignity and independent stature of the
state courts," he candidly adds that the proposals will reduce the resources
expended in postconvictin litigation under present law and, most important, "accord more appropriate weight to the interest in finality in criminal
adjudication." ' -4 The problem, it seems, is that habeas corpus reflects
"excessive concern with procedural formalisms" and creates "burdens"
5
that frustrate the "essential objectives of our criminal justice system.''
More bluntly, postconviction habeas focuses too much on the procedural
safeguards guaranteed in criminal cases under the Federal Constitution
and too little on what it takes to convict the guilty and keep them convicted.
If theoretical justification is needed for restricting or eliminating the
postconviction writ, I suspect Smith would find that justification in the
so-called "process" model, which has it that the "correct" result on any
claim is never certain, and there is no reason to believe that the second
judgment on a claim by a federal court is more likely to be "correct"
than the previous determination by a state court.5 6 What counts, or ought
to count, is whether some fair process was employed in state court to come
to a decision-whatever the decision was. If the state courts accorded the
petitioner an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a federal claim,
the "process" model is satisfied even if a federal habeas court would reach
a different result if it were to treat the merits a second time. 57 The substantive decision is unimportant, so long as the procedure by which it was
obtained was adequate. Ultimately, the "process" model would have it
that "a prisoner is legally detained if he is held pursuant to the judgment
or decision of a competent tribunal or authority, even though the decision to detain rested on an error as to law or fact.' '58
Habeas arguments grounded in the "process" model have a long
history. Standard counterarguments are equally familiar. I suspect that
if the state courts are improved, as Attorney General Smith insists they
are, it is because of the continued existence of federal habeas corpus. State
petitions make up a large proportion of the federal docket), with Wulf, Limiting Prisoner
Access to Habeas Corpus-Assault on the Great Writ, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 253, 253-57 (1973)
(insisting that the federal courts are not overburdened by habeas petitions).
54. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 47 (letter from William French Smith, U.S. Attorney Gen., to George Bush, President of the Senate (Mar. 3, 1982)).
55. Id.at ,6.
56. Bator, Finality inCriminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 441, 444-53 (1963).
57. See Peller, InDefense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 579, 586-90 (1982) (describing Professor Bator's model).
58. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

1238 (1953), quoted inBator, Finality inCriminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 447-48 (1963), and Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus
Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 588 n.37 (1982). While I am not prepared

to embrace Peller's implicit suggestion that the model is flawed in all contexts, it will
be plain below that I find his critique within the habeas field unanswerable except on
ideological grounds. See text accompanying notes 59-64 infra.
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judges may look harder for meritorious claims if they know that the federal
courts stand ready to find, and award relief on, claims that are overlooked
or undervalued in the state forum. The functional merits of federal habeas
are genuine and are not to be discarded in the name of maintaining
psychological peace among recalcitrant state judges.5 9 Federal habeas corpus
rests now, as it has for decades, on a quasi-constitutional principle that
resists the "process" model in this field-the proposition that persons convicted of crimes in state courts are entitled to at least one opportunity
to litigate their federal claims in a federal forum. 60 Since Brown, if not
before, the federal writ has served as an effective vehicle for guaranteeing
such a forum. The Supreme Court lacks the resources necessary to treat
all or even many cases on direct review, and, therefore, the federal habeas
courts have long served as functional surrogates. 61 The asserted "right
to a federal forum" in this context is more than ipse dixit. It is the bedrock
of American criminal justice, and it has been for thirty years. 62 The Great
Writ is now what it was historically-an instrument of governmental
administration. 63 Within the field in which it operates, the writ orchestrates
the distribution of decision-making authority between and among the
59. Cf Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-18 (1977)
(disputing the view that state courts can be relied on to administer federal rights).
60. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV.

L. REV. 84, 106-07 (1959) (deriving this principle from the Court's decision in

Brown).

61. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. I hasten to say that in recent nonhabeas cases the Justices have denied that federal
rights are always entitled to elaboration in a federal forum. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 606 n. 18 (1975). There are, however, greater concerns in criminal cases,
in which individuals face deprivation of physical liberty, than in ordinary proceedings,
in which the stakes are different. Cf Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (explaining exemption for habeas from ordinary res judicata principles on
ground that habeas is limited to attacks on "custody"). The Brown principle is alive and
well in habeas cases even if the federal forum is more difficult to obtain these days for
other kinds of litigation. See SOCIETY OF AMERICAN LAW TEACHERS, SUPREME COURT
DENIAL OF CITIZEN ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS TO CHALLENGE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
OR OTHER UNLAWFUL ACTIONS: THE RECORD OF THE BURGER COURT 1-3 (1976);
Neuborne, The Procedural Assault on the Warren Legacy: A Study in Repeal by Indirection, 5
HOFSTRA L. REV. 545, 545 (1977).
63. I have sketched the history of the Great Writ elsewhere. See L. YACKLE, supra
note 6, § 4 (1981). Suffice it to say here that the writ was developed by the central courts
in England as a weapon for wagingjurisdictional wars among themselves and for drawing
power to determine causes away from preexisting manorial and other local courts. See
generally R. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY (1960). As Professor Meador points out, the experience
with the federal writ in the United States arguably tracks what occurred in England roughly
three centuries ago. Habeas serves as a vehicle for redistributing decision-making authority
within the federal system-from the state courts to the lower federal courts exercising
jurisdiction in collateral proceedings. D. MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER AND LIBERTY 70-83 (1966); see also W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980) (embracing Meador's thesis). See generally
Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A PeculiarPath to Fame, 53 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 983, 1007-25 (1978) (covering the earliest English precedents).
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various courts with subject matter jurisdiction to hear vital claims. Ultimate
responsibility for the protection of individual federal claims is thus transferred from the state to the federal courts. 64 It very much does matter,
then, that a federal court might reach a decision different from that arrived
at in state court, however "full" and "fair" the state court procedure.
A genuine, serious, second look in federal court is part and parcel of the
constitutional design.
The ideological battle lines are thus drawn. Any serious discussion
of the controversy surrounding postconviction habeas must acknowledge
them. Over the years, there have been many attempts by the detractors
65
of the writ to undercut its general availability as a postconviction remedy.
66
Most efforts to restrict the writ by legislation have failed in the Congress.
Always, however, there have been critics whose zeal in attacking postconiction habeas is matched only by their persistence in carrying the fight
on through the years. At root, the motivation is ideological. It is, of course,
not uncommon that political positions harden in the psychological make-up
of those who embrace them. They may, then, take on a life of their own.
So it is with the criticism of postconviction habeas. Old arguments have
surfaced again in Attorney General Smith's comments and the Reagan
Administration's proposals. It is time, now, to engage them.
II.

THE BILL ITSELF: A SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

A. The Proposal to Bar Habeas Relief if a Claim
Was Fully and Fairly Adjudicated in State Proceedings
The Reagan Administration's bill would add a new subsection to section 225467 of the Judicial Code and would bar federal habeas relief to
prisoners attacking state judgments in identified circumstances:
64. L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 19, at 91 (1981). Justice Stewart's opinion for the
Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), stated the matter plainly and without

dissent:
A judgment by a state appellate court rejecting a challenge to evidentiary sufficiency is of course entitled to deference by the federal courts, a is any judgment
affirming a criminal conviction. But Congress in § 2254 has selected the federal
district courts as precisely the forums that are responsible for determining whether

state convictions have been secured in accord with federal constitutional law.
The federal habeas corpus statute presumes the norm of a fair trial in the state
court and adequate state postconviction remedies to redress possible error....
What it does not presume is that these state proceedings will always be without

error in the constitutional sense. The duty of a federal habeas corpus court to
appraise a claim that constitutional error did occur-reflecting as it does the
belief that the "finality" of a deprivation of liberty through the invocation of
the criminal sanction is simply not to be achieved at the expense of a constitutional right-is not one that can be so lightly abjured.
Id. at 323 (citation omitted).
65. L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 19, at 91-92.
66. See id. § 19, at 92 (1981).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976), The current statute covers the exhaustion of state remedies
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(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that has been fully
68
and fairly adjudicated in State proceedings ....
The proposal strikes to the core of the postconviction writ. Buried
in a suggested amendment to a section of the Judicial Code now governing only the timing of federal habeas review, it threatens to write an end
to the principle, established in Brown, that prisoners are entitled to at least
one opportunity to litigate their federal claims against criminal convictions in a federal forum and that ordinary preclusion rules are inapplicable
in habeas. 69 A retreat from that proposition would have enormous impact
on the enforcement of the United States Constitution as it applies to state
criminal prosecutions. The very framework of the criminal justice system
would be altered beyond recognition. The proposal constitutes very bad
70
public policy, and it may be unconstitutional.
and the federal effect to be given state court determinations of primary fact. See note 96
infra and accompanying text.
68. S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1982), reprintedin Reform Act, supra note 17,
at 9, 13.
69. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
70. Justice Rehnquist's important opinion for the Court in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977), expressly reaffirmed the commitment to Brown. Id. at 87. The federal
habeas courts, therefore, do continue to enjoy power to readjudicate federal issues, notwithstanding previous determinations in state court. See Seidman, FactualGuilt and the Burger
Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV.

436, 465 (1980) (emphasizing the Burger Court's refusal to repudiate the fundamental
propositions underlying the Warren Court's habeas decisions). I do not intend to address
the available arguments, grounded in the suspension and due process clauses, that the
elimination or serious restriction of federal collateral review would be unconstitutional.
The signals from the Justices have been mixed at best. Compare Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963) (warning that statutory changes that "derogate from the traditional liberality of the writ ... might raise serious constitutional questions"), with Swain
v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing that suspension clause requires only retention of writ as it was understood at time Constitution was
adopted).
The constitutional difficulties presented by the proposal to establish a statute of limitations in habeas justify, however, another out-sized footnote. See note 22 supra. The Supreme
Court's unfortunate embrasure of the "total exhaustion" rule in Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509, 522 (1982), makes the very idea of a statute of limitations untenable. The
district courts have now been instructed to dismiss entirely petitions raising more than
one claim if any has not yet been put to the state courts. In effect, of course, prisoners
are encouraged to delay the presentation of claims with respect to which state remedies
have been exhausted while other, "unexhausted" claims manage to "catch up." Combined with a statute of limitations, the "total exhaustion" rule would cause enormous
difficulty for litigants attempting in good faith to follow prescribed procedures.
In the simplest illustration, a prisoner may have two federal claims, only one of which
has been put to the state courts. A statute of limitations would require the presentation
of the "exhausted" claim as soon as possible and, under the Administration's bill, at
least within a year after the completion of exhaustion. S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 2 (1982), reprinted in Reform Act, supra note 17, at 9, 10; Reform Act, supra note 17,
at 75-78 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of Justice). The Lundy rule, on the
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The Administration fully appreciates the gravity of the matter. The
commentary accompanying the proposal takes aim at Brown and the
"redundancy" of federal relitigation in habeas. Brown, it is said, was an
"arbitrary" departure from precedent; federal relitigation constitutes an
"anomalous" attempt to reexamine questions of law, as opposed to fact,
in defiance of "common sense" and "sound judicial policy." ' 71 Born of
an ideological opposition to the very existence of postconviction habeas,
the proposal relies for support on views squarely rejected by the Supreme
73
72
Court in Brown and again in Fay v. Noia and Townsend v. Sain. Put
in contemporary terms, the bill embraces the "process" model of adjudication, long championed by habeas critics. 74 Yet, nowhere does the Admin-

other hand, sends just the opposite signal, instructing the petitioner intentionally to withhold
the "exhausted" claim so that it can be presented together with the currently "unexhausted" claim-that is, after the latter has been taken to state court. See Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982).
The likely result, should Lundy be joined by a statute of limitations, could only be
the coerced forfeiture of "unexhausted" claims in all too many cases. Prisoners would
be forced to jettison them in the manner of armies leaving behind their wounded. Currently "unexhausted" claims threaten to delay the presentation of claims already
"exhausted" beyond the period permitted by the proposed statute. One hardly must be
a devotee of habeas corpus to recognize that inconsistent procedural requirements may
constitute due process violations.
71. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 89-93 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't
of Justice).
72. 372 U.S. 391, 415-26 (1963).
73. 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963).
74. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra. Indeed, the Justice Department commentary accompanying this proposal expressly relies on Professor Bator's analysis. Reform
Act, supra note 17, at 90 n.44, 91 n.49, 92 n.52 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't
of Justice). On the other hand, even as the Administration would discard Townsend's
understanding of the federal courts' role in examining mixed or legal questions, it relies
for its definition of "full and fair" litigation of such claims on Townsend's treatment of
factual issues determined in state court. The commentary states that the meaning of "full
and fair" state litigation (of mixed and legal issues under the bill) "has both significant
affinities to and significant differences from the notion of a 'full and fair' hearing specified
by the six criteria set forth in Townsend" for the treatment of state fact-finding. Id. at 94.
Accordingly, the Townsend factors serve as a "useful reference point" for explaining what
the bill intends to accomplish. Id. Specifically, the commentary provides the following
summary:
[A] state adjudication would be full and fair in the sense of proposed subsection
(d) if: (i) the claim at issue was actually considered and decided on the merits
in state proceedings; (ii) the factual determination of the state court, the disposition resulting from its application of the law to the facts, and its view of the
applicable rule of federal law were reasonable; (iii) the adjudication was consistent with the procedural requirements of federal law; and (iv) there is no new
evidence of substantial importance which could not reasonably have been produced at the time of the state adjudication and no subsequent change of law
of substantial importance has occurred.
Id. at 98.
In fairness, this many-pronged definition does reflect some effort to avoid truly harsh
results should the state courts abuse their new-found authority, for example, by employ-
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istration reconcile its proposal to alter radically the criminal justice system
with the Court's landmark decisions in the field. To its credit, the Administration does not seek to enlist the Court's decision in Stone v. Powell75
to service in its cause, though, to be sure, Stone is the one recent decision
that seems, on first blush, to fit.
The Court held in Stone that
where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may
not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was
76
introduced at his trial.
That holding bears some facial similarity to the "process' model, and
some observers have connected the two. 77 Their focus is on the federal
courts' continued willingness to entertain fourth amendment claims if the
state courts deny would-be petitioners an "opportunity" for "full and
fair litigation" of those claims. 78 While federal courts will not second-guess
ing procedure that is itself unconstitutional or refusing to recognize new and controlling
decisions. At the same time, there are obvious holes in the net, through which meritorious
cases may slip unnoticed. When, one may ask, is a state court's legal determination so
"unreasonable" that a federal court can take a hand, notwithstanding the general rule
that legal conclusions, like factual findings, are entitled to deference? The only suggestion
the Administration offers is simplistic. If some, though not all, the federal circuits agree
with the state court, a federal habeas court reviewing the state court's work cannot find
it unreasonable. Fair enough. But does that mean that in every case there must be some,
perhaps federal, precedent supporting the state court before habeas review is precluded?
If so, must the precedent be "on all fours" with the current case? If not, what support
will make the state court's judgment reasonable? The force of its own analysis? One would
expect the Administration to find that sufficient, but then to have difficulty explaining
how a federal district judge is to operate on that basis without, in the end, doing precisely
what is done under present law.
The Administration offers no analogous instance in which the federal courts are called
upon to decide whether the legal conclusions of other tribunals are "reasonable," and
the possibilities that come to mind do not seem apt. Cf Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979) (permitting federal habeas courts to determine whether jury could
reasonably have determined that defendant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt). At best,
the "reasonable" legal judgment test proposed in the bill does not achieve the clarity
the Administration purports to seek, but rather promises the further confusion that inevitably accompanies malleable standards of review.
75. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
76. Id. at 494. In actuality, the Court offered as many as three statements of its holding
in Stone. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 98, at 377-78 (1981). Most observers have settled
on the passage quoted in the text, however, as expressing the Court's true intentions.
See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035, 1094 (1977); Robbins & Sanders, Judicial Integrity, the Appearance ofJustice, and the
Great Writ of Habeas Corpus: How to Kill Two Thirds (or More) with One Stone, 15 AM. CRIM

L. REV. 63, 75 (1977).
77. See Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV, C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 579, 602 (1982); Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 456-59 (1980).
78. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494. Precisely what is meant by this "opportunity" for "full
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state court judgments simply because they find them incorrect, they will
79
review the manner in which the state courts reach the merits.
Arguments along these lines move too far on too little hard evidence.
I have toyed with the idea that Stone contemplates a radical shift backward
to the days of Frank v. Mangum,8" when the Court understood the fourteenth amendment to demand only that the state courts accord criminal
defendants a trial under settled, state-established procedures. 81 During that
period, due process of law meant no more than a "regular course of administration through courts of justice."8' 2 The question, put bluntly, is this:
Can Stone mean that once the state courts have provided petitioners with
an opportunity to litigate exclusionary rule claims, and, if asked to do
so, have adjudicated those claims in a manner consistent with state law,
then by those same actions they have provided the fourteenth amendment
process that is "due" in such matters? If that is the case, the only applicable constitutional standard will have been met, and, by definition, there
can be no constitutional violation to be found-in habeas corpus or
anywhere else. The idea is preposterous, and no one can seriously entertain it for long. The Court is not in the business of reworking one and
one-half centuries of constitutional jurisprudence. The procedures by which
state courts dispose of criminal cases are not for the states alone to deter-

and fair litigation" in state court has consumed the time and energy of more than a few
courts and commentators. See Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary
Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 30-31 (1982) (proposing that
"systemic" fourth amendment "errors" still are cognizable in federal habeas); cf. Dunn
v. Rose, 504 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (holding essentially that Stone is
only a collateral estoppel case and that fourth amendment claims are precluded in federal
habeas only if they were actually presented to and decided by state courts). Compare Gamble
v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that "opportunity" for full
and fair litigation includes but is not limited to procedural opportunity to present fourth
amendment claim in state court and that federal courts must enforce application of correct legal standard), with Williams v. Brown, 609 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1980) (settling
for mere existence of procedural opportunity to raise federal claim and foreclosing federal

review even when mistakes of fact or law frustrate treatment given to that claim), and
Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting both Gamble and Williams
and demanding both a routine procedural mechanism for presenting fourth amendment
claims and assurance that the mechanism worked in case at bar to provide the petitioner
with full and fair adjudication). I have collected the authorities and offered my own assessment elsewhere. See generally L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 99.
79. Inasmuch as the Reagan Administration's definition of "full and fair" litigation
contemplates actual adjudication in state court rather than a mere opportunity for litigation, see note 74 supra, the "fit" between the bill and Stone is not tight. While the bill
would defer to state court judgments on all claims when there was "full and fair" litigation, Stone defers only in fourth amendment cases, and then it defers whether or not the
petitioner took advantage of available state procedures for litigation.
80. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
81. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, 5 98.
82. In re Ah Lee, 5 F. 899, 905 (D. Or. 1880) (quoting 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAw 612 (O.W. Holmes 12th ed. 1873)), dis-sed in Peller, In Defense of
Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579, 626-28 (1982).
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mine. They are subject to federal standards derived from the Bill of Rights,
albgeit funneled through the fourteenth amendment.8 3 It is sheer nonsense
to propose that the state courts are not constitutionally answerable, in the
wake of Stone, for their treatment of claims that federally mandated procedural safeguards were not respected in local proceedings.
it is, of course, one thing to propose that Stone alters the very meaning of the fourteenth amendment, as its requirements are determined in
any court, and quite another to suggest that Stone limits habeas corpus
review to claims that would have been cognizable even in the days of Frank.
It is at least tenable to argue that, after Stone, the habeas courts will treat
federal claims raised by petitioners challenging state convictions as though
the fourteenth amendment meant no more than it did at the turn of the
century. So to argue is only to maintain that the federal habeas courts
will defer to state court decisions on whether particular federal safeguards
were breached in state proceedings and will limit their own attention to
the procedural structure within which the state courts made their determinations of federal claims. Only when the state courts refused petitioners
a forum entirely or frustrated the fair treatment of claims in some fashion
will the federal habeas courts review the substantive merits. If state court
results were reached after acceptable procedure, they can be reexamined
only on direct review in the Supreme Court.
The argument is tenable but cannot be sustained. There is certainly
no warrant for such a view in the relevant statutes, which uniformly contemplate that the federal habeas courts will enforce the Federal Constitution as it is interpreted today. 84 If, for example, the introduction of an
inculpatory statement deliberately elicited from an indicted defendant raises
a sixth amendment question, the federal habeas courts are charged with
treating that issue straightforwardly. They are not limited to review of
the procedure by which the state courts addressed the question.8 5 In
numerous recent cases, the Court has reaffirmed, at least implicitly, the
authority of the federal habeas courts to reach and determine the merits
of particular constitutional claims, notwithstanding previous state court
litigation, however "full" and "fair". 86 There is only one case that can
be cited to the contrary: Stone itself. That case must be explained in another
way.

83. See Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 579, 648 (1982) (dating Supreme Court's willingness to hold that fourteenth amendment establishes independent standards for criminal trials from important decision in Moore
v. Dempsey, 61 U.S. 86 (1923)).
84. Cf Tushnet, Constitutionaland Statutory Analyses in the Law of FederalJurisdiction, 25

U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1301, 1316-18 (1978) (finding no warrant in the habeas statutes for
the manipulation accomplished in Stone).
85. The Court's recent decision in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), is proof
enough. Stone was not mentioned.
86. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1980); Rose v. Mitchell,
443 U.S. 545, 560-61 (1979); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516 (1978).
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The Court's opinion in Stone is perplexing. I have confessed elsewhere
that I cannot reconcile Justice Powell's insistence, on the one hand, that
the decision does not "mean that [a] federal court lacks jurisdiction over
such a claim,'

'

with his necessary holding, on the other hand, that custody

of a petitioner does not violate federal law if the petitioner's exclusionary
rule claims were, or might have been, fairly litigated in a state court
proceeding.8 8 The answer cannot be that fourth amendment exclusionary
rule claims are not grounded in the Constitution. Even if that is true,
the exclusionary rule surely constitutes federal, nonconstitutional lawthe violation of which can, under the controlling statute, be raised in
habeas.8 9 Nor can Stone reflect the Court's intention to restrict habeas review
to "fundamental" claims and thus to eliminate from consideration federal
claims that are ranked lower in a hierarchy of significance, perhaps because
they do not bear on the petitioner's factual guilt or innocence. 90 Stone itself
will not sustain the thesis that habeas has been so drastically circumscribed.
More recent decisions make'the thesis even weaker. 91
87. 428 U.S. at 495 n.37.
88. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, () 98, at 379-80 (1981).
89. Id.at 380.
90. Most observers agree, of course, that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
actually retards the pursuit of truth at trial. Justice Powell included a footnote in Stone
which said that "[r]esort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure
that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system of government." 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. Dissenting in Stone, Justice Brennan saw in this a "novel reinterpretation of the hapeas statutes,"
which ultimately would eliminate all but "guilt-related" claims from the scope of the writ.
Id.at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting). There is, to be sure, considerable support for
Justice Brennan's concern in the literature. See, e.g., Kelley, Preferred-Rightsand Strict Scrutiny
in the Law of Habeas Corpus, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 754, 787 (1978); Michael, The "New"
Fede-alism and the Burger Court'sDeference to the States in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 IOWA
L. REV. 233, 249 (1979); Soloff, Litigation and Relitigation: Th; Uncertain Status of Federal
Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV 297, 307 (1978). As far as I am concerned, however, Justice Brennan's arm-waving comes too soon. See text accompanying
notes 92-95 infra; cf. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity
and Change inCriminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 437 (1980) (Burger Court has
not yet abandoned its predecessor's concentration on procedural safeguards in criminal
cases, notwithstanding petitioner's apparent factual guilt).
91. Beginning with Stone itself, it seems plain enough that Justice Powell was restrained
when speaking for the full Court-more so than in his concurring opinion in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973), in which he had previously derided fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims because they bear "no relation to the prisoner's innocence"
and bring relief to petitioners who are usually "quitejustly detained." Id.at 258 (Powell,
J., concurring) (emphasis original). The inference I draw is that Powell himself, together,
perhaps, with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, may well be prepared to
introduce the question of factual guilt into habeas review. Even they must acknowledge
that history is against the idea, however, id.at 257 (Powell, J., concurring), and no one
has pointed to any statutory authority for such a course. Stone, 427 U.S. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (insisting that the statutes draw no such distinction). More important, the rest of the Justices have been at pains to dissociate themselves from the notion.
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), for example, Justice Blackmun's opinion for
the Court rejected any analogy to Stone and held, flatly, that habeas petitioners alleging
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I settle on a much less devastating estimate of Stone. The case is not
in the mainstream of habeas corpus cases at all; it is only another in a
line of recent exclusionary rule decisions, which have pared down a species
of privilege that the Court now considers to have been established by the
Justices themselves. 92 The question whether to apply the exclusionary rule,
in habeas corpus or in any other context, is to be answered by weighing
the "utility" of the rule as a deterrent to police misconduct against the
"costs" of invoking it. 93 Stone is, then, of a piece with other recent decisions which have balanced "definitionally" and have determined that
9
the costs of the rule outweigh its utility in an entire category of cases. 4
Fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims will no longer bring relief
in most habeas cases not because the scope of the writ has been narrowed
by Stone, but because the exclusionary rule itself has been changed by the
tribunal that created it. If this reading of Stone is accurate, then there is
little basis for expecting the same habeas fate to await other federal claims.
Such concerns should be seriously entertained only if the Court indicates
that other rules, too, are scheduled for surgery. I am aware of no such
9
signals. 5
race discrimination in the selection of grand jurors are not foreclosed from habeas, despite
the conceded truth that, having been convicted by unchallenged petit juries, they do not
contest the integrity of the guilt-determination process at trial. Id. at 560-64. Justice Powell's
concurring opinion, which argued that Stone should control. Id. at 587 n.10 (Powell, J.,
concurring), was joined only by Justice Rehnquist, id. at 579 (Powell, J., concurring).
More recently, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107 (1982), rejected out of hand the suggestion that habeas claims are to be divided between
those that are and are not related to the determination of factual guilt. Id. at 129. See
Oral Argument Transcript, at 35-36, Isaac (argument of Mr. Aynes) (attempting to persuade the Court to restrict the Sykes analysis to cases in which the underlying claim is
not closely related to the guilt-determination process). While in that case the distinction
was offered by the prisoners and would have advanced their cause in habeas, the Court's
refusal to embrace the argument implied no intention to take account of the character
of federal claims only when the petitioner stands to lose if a claim is determined to be
insufficiently related to factual guilt.
92. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See generally Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1981).
93. Stone, 428 U.S. at 489.
94. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (refusing to invoke
exclusionary rule when grand jury witnesses were asked questions based on information
obtained in violation of fourth amendment); cf Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522, 525-26
(6th Cir. 1982) (reading Stone to mean that once a fourth amendment claim has been considered by two levels of state courts, the issue must be considered "close" and thus the
ultimate decision is unlikely to provide useful guidance to police officers in the field).
95. Indeed, the Court has very recently reaffirmed the viability of exclusionary rules
based on the fifth and sixth amendments. E.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483-85
(1981) (fifth amendment); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (fifth amendment);
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397-406 (1977) (sixth amendment). Moreover, when
claims of that kind have been raised in recent habeas cases, the Court has declined the
opportunity to "extend" the Stone analysis. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 389-406 (not mentioning Stone in a sixth amendment decision). Compare id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(unsuccessfully arguing that Stone should control), with id. at 413-14 (Powell, J., concurr-
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The Stone decision, in sum, does not support the Administration's
proposal to build the "process" model into federal habeas corpus review
of state court judgments. The bill, of course, would permit the federal
courts to examine the way in which federal claims we*re treated in state
court; federal relief would still be available if prisoners' claims were not
fully and fairly adjudicated there. That, however, is small comfort. There
is a wide gulf between the authority to appraise the procedural aspects
of state court litigation and the power to reexamine the substantive results
reached in state court as contemplated by present law. If the gulf is to
be bridged and current law shown to be unnecessary for the protection
of federal rights, better arguments must be made-and quickly. At present,
the Administration rests only on its own statements that Brown was simply
wrong and that postconviction habeas is unnecessarily redundant. That
will not do at all.
B.

The Proposal to Defer to State Factual Findings

The Reagan Administration's bill would also amend what is now 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). 96 That subsection currently governs the effect to be
ing) (circumventing the Stone analogy). I count these decisions as evidence that Stone is
sui generis in the habeas context-a case about the fourth amendment exclusionary rule,
not habeas. If a similar analysis is employed again by the Court in habeas, it will be
because another judge-made rule is due to be altered and not because claims grounded
in such rules have somehow been eliminated generically from the scope of the postconviction writ.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976). Section 2254 covers generally the matter of exhaustion of state remedies and the effect to be given state court findings of primary fact. The
current subsection (d), of interest here, provides:
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,
a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State
court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the
writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a
written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia,
shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall
otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State
court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over
the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent
him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing
in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the
State court proceeding;
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given certaiii state court findings of primary fact in federal evidentiary
hearings. 97 The bill would redesignate the subsection as a new subsection
(e), which would provide:
(e) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court, a full and fair determination of a factual issue
made in the case by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting this
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 98
At first blush, the Administration's proposal seems anything but
sinister and, indeed, appears only to discard language in the present statute
and to replace it with comparatively clear and straightforward guidelines.
If that were all, I would raise no objection. Section 2254(d) as it now stands
is not happily drafted. 99 The truth is, however, that the Administration's
amendment does propose substantive changes. My objections must be taken
in turn.
First, the Administration's bill is poorly written; it is grammatically
flawed. While "adjudication" may be described as "full and fair," I do
not comprehend how a "determination" can be. A "determination" is
not process but conclusion, which is either right or wrong but can never
be "full and fair." Second, the bill is far less demanding than present
law regarding the prerequisites for a presumption of correctness. Under
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in
which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to
a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the
Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole
concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by
the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one
or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1)
to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted
by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered
as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall
rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
Id.
97. See Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982) (making it clear that only determinations of evidentiary facts fall within the statute); cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 341-42 (1980) (distinguishing "legal" or "mixed" questions of law and fact); Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397 n.4 (1977) (distinguishing "legal" or "mixed" questions).
But see L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 134 (Supp. 1982) (criticizing the Court's illustrations
of primary facts and worrying that some are actually "mixed" questions).
98. S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1982), reprinted in Reform Act, supra note 17,
at 9, 13-14.
99. See Reform Act, supra note 17, at 100 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't
of Justice).
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current law, state findings of primary fact are not entitled to the presumption if any of eight standards described in the statute are not met. The
only guidance the bill offers is the vague statement that state determinations must have been "full and fair"-whatever that means. 0 0
By omitting key requirements in present law, the Congress would
signal the federal courts that they no longer need demand such important
safeguards as actual hearings in state court and written findings. 01' Factual determinations unsupported by adequate evidence in a hearing might
be proffered to the federal courts by state officials who can only testify
to them orally. Even if one is committed, as I am not, to the proposition
that some state findings of primary fact may safely be accepted by the
federal habeas courts, the safeguards set forth in the present statute are
critical. While one can argue with the description of the eight standards
under present law, the elimination of those relatively specific guidelines
would generate risks. The present statute has stood the test of litigation
and has established a framework by which federal courts can weigh state
court findings. The Administration's loose language provides no guarantee
that reliably found facts will form the basis for federal litigation of federal
claims and, instead, promises to import needless uncertainty into habeas
10 2
proceedings.
Finally, present law requires the respondent to present "due proof'
of factual determinations and, if all eight standards are satisfied, places
the burden on the petitioner to establish by "convincing" evidence that
100. The Justice Department's commentary offers an explanation, albeit an unsatisfactory one. The descriptive phrase "full and fair" would have the same meaning in this
context as in the proposed new subsection (d). Reform Act, supra note 17, at 100 (sectionby-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of Justice); see note 74 supra.
101. The Administration's proposal would essentially wipe out the effect of the first Mata
decision, in which the Court ordered the federal habeas courts to identify the particular
standard, set forth in the present statute, on which state procedures foundered. Sumner
v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551 (1981). Cf Reynolds, Sumnerv. Mata" Twilight's Last Gleaming
for FederalHabeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions? Speculationson the Future of the Great
Writ, 4 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 289, 290 (1981) (reading Mata itself to demand
greater deference to state findings than is justified).
102. But see United States ex rel. Jones v. Franzen, 676 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Posner, J., concurring) (proposing precisely this kind of legislation, though without
reference to any pending bill). I must say, however, that this proposal is preferable to
the suggestion of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, which would have
required the federal habeas courts to permit state courts to conduct any necessary evidentiary hearings. See note 16 supra. Precisely how such a system might operate is anything
but clear. Other pending bills in Congress would also legislatively overrule Townsend, albeit
with other language. See, e.g., S. 653, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 134, 97th Cong.,
lt Sess. (1981). Some bills, for obscure reasons, would amend the Federal Magistrates
Act to prohibit magistrates from conducting habeas evidentiary hearings without the consent of the parties. S. 653, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 134, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); H.R. 3416, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See also Habeas Corpus Procedures Amendmeints Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 653 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on
theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 174-75 (1981) (speculating that the effect of such legislation
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the state determinations are erroneous.10 3 The Administration's bill says
nothing at all about the burden of proving state findings and refashions
the applicant's burden as one of rebutting the presumption by "clear and
convincing" evidence.' 04 In this, I doubt the bill poses a serious threat
to existing arrangements. Even without an express provision placing the
burden to prove the existence of state findings on the respondent, it is
likely that it would work out that way in practice. It is, after all, usually
in the respondent's interest to proffer state factual determinations to the
federal courts. Moreover, the addition of the modifier "clear" probably
would not be viewed by the courts as meaningful. If, however, the Administration's bill promises no substantive advantages in these regards and
fails to clarify the congressional purpose, there is no reason to.change the
statutory language already familiar to the courts. It seems a bit early to
urge amendments to a 1966 statute, absent evidence that change is actually needed.
The commentary accompanying the proposed new subsection (e)
argues that the changes would not be significant, if, that is, proposed subsection (d) is enacted into law.105 Inasmuch as "full and fair" state procedures
would cut off federal review of prisoners' claims entirely, the proposal
to force federal courts to accept state factual findings in the same circumstances would be virtually superfluous. Only in the rare case in which
state procedures are "full and fair" with respect to legal or factual issues,
but not with respect to both, would the separate treatment of those matters in the bill make any practical difference. The truth is, however, that
much more is at stake. Given the extraordinary step that the enactment
of proposed subsection (d) would constitute, it surely is unlikely that Congress will embrace it. If that prediction is accurate, close attention should
be paid to the shortcomings of proposed subsection (e) as well, lest it be
mistaken for the stylistic amendment to the present statute it may appear
on first glance to be.
Subsection (e), in fact, touches matters of genuine significance. Just
as present law contemplates federal court relitigation of legal or "mixed"
questions determined in state court, it also recognizes broad authority in
the federal habeas courts to make their own determinations of primary
fact, notwithstanding the findings of the state courts.10 6 At least since Brown,
would be a sharp reduction in hearings for the sole reason that district judges lack the
time to conduct them personally).
103. See note 96 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
105. See Reform Act, supra note 17, at 100 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't

of Justice).
106. See Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger Court's Deference to the States in
FederalHabeas Proceedings, 64 IOWA L. REV. 233, 240-41, 253-54 (1979) (advancing thesis

that fact relitigation has always been the key basis for tension regarding federal habeas
jurisdiction).
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the Supreme Court has recognized that federal claims are tied tightly to
the evidentiary facts that give rise to them. Indeed, the very notion of
"mixed" questions is evidence that legal and factual issues are
distinguishable in some instances only in the most artificial way. 10 7 The
most sensitive investigation of underlying facts is necessary to the fair and
just determination of federal claims that arise in criminal prosecutions.
It hardly need be said that the court with power to determine historical
facts authoritatively may well be the court that controls the outcome.' 0 8
That insight almost certainly led the Court in Brown to recognize a discretionary power in the federal habeas courts to redetermine facts as found
by the state courts and to mandate federal relitigation in "unusual
circumstances," 10 9 when there was a "vital flaw" in state fact-finding
procedures,1 10 or when the state court record was incomplete or inadequate to permit the federal courts to appraise the result reached in the
state forum. In Townsend v. Sain, the Court improved upon Brown by setting forth with greater care and precision the circumstances in which a
federal evidentiary hearing is mandatory."'
After a federal habeas court determines, under the complex analysis
established in Townsend, that a federal evidentiary hearing must or should
be conducted, the next logical question is the weight prior state court findings are to be given in the federal hearing.1 2 That issue is controlled by
the current subsection (d). The statute does not require federal habeas
courts to embrace state factual findings outright, but only establishes a
"presumption of correctness" in favor of state findings in identified circumstances. The presumption arises only if (1) the state court findings
were made after a hearing, (2) the hearing reached the merits of the factual issues, (3) the state court was of competent jurisdiction, (4) the applicant was a party to the proceeding, (5) the determinations are "evidenced"
by "adequate written indicia," and (6) the state court proceedings do
not fail one of eight statutory tests" 3 which roughly track the criteria
107. Cf Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507 (1953) (separate opinion of Frankfurter,
J.) (discussing the problems presented by "mixed" questions).
108. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416
(1964); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 228 (1908).
109. 344 U.S. at 463.
110. Id. at 506 (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

111. 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963). See Wright & Sofaer, FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 919-22 (1966).
112. The initial decision whether a federal evidentiary hearing must or should be held

iscontrolled by the standards set forth in Townsend. Section 2254(d), as it now reads,
addresses the posterior question of the effect to be accorded state findings in a federal
hearing. Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1122
n.46 (1970); accord LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 701 n.2 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 218 (1982) (noting that "in such [federal
habeas] proceedings" the federal habeas court "must not disturb the findings of state
courts unless the federal habeas court articulates some basis for disarming such findings

of the statutory presumption") (emphasis added).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976), reproducedat note 96 supra. The Federal Constitution
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established in Townsend for making the anterior decision whether a federal
hearing must be held in the first instance. If the petitioner demonstrates
that the state court hearing was inadequate under one or more of those
standards, the case is taken out of the statute altogether. In that event,
the state court determinations are not presumed correct, and the federal
hearing must be a fresh one. The petitioner still has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that relief is warranted, but the
prisoner's case for relief is no longer burdened by a presumption in favor
14

of state court findings. 1

The Administration's objective in proposing changes in this scheme
is plain enough. The attempt to attach greater "finality" to state criminal
judgments would be furthered to the extent state findings of evidentiary
fact are accepted in federal habeas. Then, too, a larger portion of the
decision-making authority in criminal cases could be kept at the state level
through the artifice of characterizing issues as factual rather than legal.
Even if the Administration fails in its attempt in proposed subsection (d)
to circumscribe federal relitigation of legal or "mixed" questions, 115 its
proposed new subsection (e) might force the federal courts at least to begin
their treatment of the merits with the facts as found in state court. Again,
control of decisions regarding the predicate facts is crucial in constitutional litigation. The Administration has its ideological agenda well in mind.
The attempt to lodge fact-finding responsibility in the state courts and
to keep it there is yet another manifestation of a larger groping toward
the elimination of the postconviction writ.
C.

The Proposal to Defer to State Procedural Grounds

While the proposed amendments to section 2254 attempt to preclude
relitigation in federal habeas corpus when the state courts have afforded
"full" and "fair" adjudication of both legal and factual issues, the Reagan
Administration reaches further in its proposed amendment to section 2244
of the Judicial Code, which now addresses only the finality of federal habeas
judgments. 1 6 The amendment would foreclose habeas review in many
cases, even though the state courts have not considered the merits of federal
claims. In this manner, the bill would enter legislatively the field now
occupied by the Supreme Court's decisions in Fay v.Noia" 7 and Wainevidently does not demand so much state court attention to procedural regularity. Yet,

if the state courts wish to see their work accepted in federal habeas, they must meet the
statutory requirements. Of course, if those requirements are met, the presumption of correctness attaches and must be respected in the federal forum. The Supreme Court said
as much in Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981), and, indeed, went on to instruct
the federal courts to explain in their opinions any failure to apply the presumption in
habeas corpus. Id. at 549.
114. L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 134, at 508 (1981).
115. See text accompanying notes 67-95 supra.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1976); see Reform Act, supra note 17, at 61-82 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of Justice).
117. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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wright v. Sykes.' 1 8 Specifically, the bill would add a new subsection to the
existing statute:
(d) When a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court fails to raise a claim in State proceedings at the
time or in the manner required by State rules of procedure, the
claim shall not be entertained in an application for a writ of habeas
corpus unless actual prejudice resulted to the applicant from the
alleged denial of the Federal right asserted and(1) the failure to raise the claim properly or to have
it heard in State proceedings was the result of State
118. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Under the Court's decision in United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152 (1982), the same standards govern collateral attacks on federal convictions pursuant to § 2255 of the Judicial Code. Id. at 166-67. I had entertained the view that the
"comity" rationale in Sykes would not extend to § 2255 cases, in which no state is involved.
The Court squarely rejected that position in Frady, however, and it seems unlikely that
the Justices will be moved to change their minds any time soon. In anticipation of the
essential equation of § 2255 with habeas, § 6 of the Administration's bill would extend
the procedural default standards set forth in the text to the § 2255 field. S. 2216, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1982), reprinted in Reform Act, supra note 17, at 9, 14-15; Reform
Act, supra note 17, at 101-02 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't ofJustice). Suffice
it to say that the analysis of those standards I offer in the following pages applies in spades
to their use in cases in which prisoners challenge federal judgments, raising claims that
were not, but might have been, presented at trial or on direct review.
In another proposed innovation touching § 2255 proceedings, §§ 3 and 4 of the Administration's bill would require unsuccessful § 2255 movants to obtain a certificate of probable cause as a necessary predicate to appellate review. S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
§§ 3, 4 (1982), reprinted in Reform Act, supra note 17, at 9, 11-12. Under present law,
only petitioners attacking state judgments must obtain such a certificate before they are
permitted to pursue an appeal to the appropriate circuit court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976);
FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). A similar proposal to extend the certificate requirement to § 2255
cases was made 10 years ago when the Nixon Administration included it in its package
of bills. S. 567, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The idea was rejected then and should be
again.
The Reagan Administration acknowledges, to some extent, the additional litigational
effort that an extension of the certification requirement would require and, in an apparent
attempt to mitigate the effect of its bill, proposes as well to eliminate the present role
of district judges. See Reform Act, supra note 17, at 82-84 (section-by-section analysis of
U.S. Dep't of Justice). The effort to place all power to permit appellate review in collateral attack cases with the circuit judges must be found wanting. If any judge can make
a reliable determination regarding the arguable merit of an appeal, it is probably the judge
who considered the claim at the trial level, even if relief was denied. I would not wish
to make a district judge's judgment final by any means. Yet, I see nothing to be gained
and much to be lost by depriving the district judges of authority to make determinations
in any case. It will not suffice to propose that, because unfavorable judgments cannot
be conclusive, petitioners should be required to go immediately to circuit judges. While
such a plan may seem plausible to the uninitiated, it proves dissatisfactory upon close
examination.
First, the proposal neglects the settled authority of district judges to guarantee that an
appeal is heard. Present law takes appropriate advantage of district judges' special knowledge
and understanding. If they issue a certificate, the circuit has no alternative. The appeal
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action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States;
(2) the Federal right asserted was not recognized prior
to the procedural default; or
(3) the factual predicate of the claim could not have
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence prior to the procedural default. 119
While forfeitures for procedural default in state court are contemplated
by present law, the regime ushered in by the Administration's bill would
be vastly more rigid.
1.

Preliminary State Law Questions

It is already true, of course, that petitioners attacking state judgments
must exhaust available and effective state remedies before seeking federal
habeas relief. 120 And, if state remedies are unavailable because of petitioners' procedural default, it is already the law that the federal courts
must be heard on the merits. Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542, 543 (1967). The
Administration's bill would consolidate decision-making authority in circuit judges who,
in their ignorance, may overlook arguable appeals that would have been identified at the
district level. Second, the proposal falls well short of what is actually needed to reduce
significantly the work load of the federal courts under the certification requirement. Only
the work of the district judges would be eliminated. Yet, they expend only limited time
and effort as compared to circuit judges. Again, district judges are familiar with the cases
in which they have already denied relief, and the decision whether to issue a certificate
can be made forthwith. Indeed, many district judges routinely issue, or decline to issue,
certificates at the same time they deny relief on the merits. See Huffman v. Moore, 333
F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (E.D. Tenn. 1971). The real waste lies at the circuit level, where
judges unfamiliar with habeas cases must consider them twice-once to determine whether
to issue a certificate and again when the merits are reached. It is this duplication of effort
that is so terribly inefficient.
119. S.2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1982), reprintedin Reform Act, supra note 17,
at 9-10. The version in the text is taken from the Administration's original communication to Congress and S.2216. Later bills propose a different part (2), which would forgive
a prisoner's default if "the Federal right asserted was newly recognized by the Supreme
Court subsequent to the procedural default and is retrospectively applicable." The change
is mildly consequential. S. 217, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S.2903, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982). See note 259 infra.
120. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Exparte Royal], 117 U.S. 241, 252-53
(1886). While the Administration's bill would not upset the exhaustion doctrine itself,
it would add a wrinkle worthy of mention. Section 5 of the bill would amend 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b) (1976), the codification of Royalt, to permit petitioners' federal claims to be
denied on the merits, notwithstanding a failure to exhaust state remedies. S.2216, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1982), reprinted in Reform Act, supra note 17, at 9, 13. In theory,
the proposal would not change present law. Despite occasional suggestions from Justice
Rehnquist to the contrary, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 n.2, 551 (1981),
the exhaustion doctrine is not now, and never has been, a jurisdictional prerequisite to
the treatment of claims on the merits. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939) (stating
clearly that the exhaustion doctrine "is not one defining power but one which relates to
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will often deny habeas review. 121 Importantly, however, under present
law a number of state law questions must be negotiated before the federal
effect of default can be determined. The ultimate question-whether procedural default under state law will foreclose federal habeas review-is,
moreover, a question of federal law to be determined by a federal court.
the appropriate exercise of power"); see L. YACKLE, supra note 6, 5§ 54-55 (examining
the doctrine's "comity" rationale). In practice, however, the federal courts do insist that
state remedies be exhausted, and it is the rare case in which the doctrine is not invoked.
See Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466, 472 (3d Cir. 1976); Needel v. Scafati, 412 F.2d 761,
766 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 861 (1969); cf Wilson v. Fogg, 571 F.2d 91, 94 n.5
(2d Cir. 1978) (taking the position that counsel for the state may not simply acquiesce
in habeas adjudication without demanding exhaustion). But see Morgan v. Wainwright,
676 F.2d 476, 477 n.1 (11th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that exhaustion is not jurisdictional
and declining to address the issue if not raised by the parties). Very recently, for example,
the Supreme Court has held that exhaustion is to be required even when it seems "Clear"
that the applicant is entitled to relief and further resort to the state courts would almost
certainly delay release from unconstitutional confinement. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454
U.S. 1, 4 (1981). In these circumstances, the wisdom of adopting a different rule when
the petitioner is to be denied relief is doubtful at best.
The Administration is quite correct, of course. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976), as it currently reads, only prohibits the award of habeas relief in the absence of exhaustion. Reform
Act, supra note 17, at 86 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't ofJustice). The statute
does not explicitly require the exhaustion of state remedies before relief can be summarily
denied. Nevertheless, exhaustion is routinely demanded in all cases, as, in fairness, the
Administration concedes. Id. The ordinary response to petitions that do not meet the exhaustion requirement is dismissal without prejudice to a renewed application for federal relief
after the exhaustion doctrine has been satisfied. Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53, 54 (1971).
The result, to be sure, is inefficient. Prisoners are often put through years of additional
litigation in both the state and federal courts only to learn in the end that their claims
were always considered to be lacking in merit, even frivolous. That, however, is inefficiency which necessarily accompanies a system that attempts to accommodate state interests. In other parts of its program, the Administration is prepared to accept even more
inefficiency in federal habeas in order to protect the asserted interest of the states and
the state courts in determining federal issues. TheJustice Department's commentary states
that this change would not offend the exhaustion doctrine's "comity" rationale because,
by hypothesis, habeas relief would be denied. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 87-88 (sectionby-section analysis of U.S. Dep't ofJustice). Yet, the Administration complains elsewhere
that habeas corpus litigation is troubling, not just the occasional award of habeas relief.
See text accompanying note 71 supra.
Finally, again according to the commentary, dismissal is not to be entered "unless a
petition's lack of merit is dear at an early point in its consideration." Reform Act, supra
note 17, at 88 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't ofJustice). One should hope
not. Even at that, the proposal increases the risk that meritorious claims will be summarily
rejected before they can be identified. It is often impossible to hold with confidence that
no set of facts can be established that would justify the award of relief before the state
courts have examined a claim and, perhaps, held evidentiary hearings to develop the record.
If we take any stock in the exhaustion doctrine at all, that much seems plain. If relief
is denied summarily by a federal district court, the petitioner will be denied the opportunity to seek a remedy in state court at all. While in theory a state remedy might be
available, as a practical matter it is unlikely that the state courts would entertain a claim
already rejected in federal habeas.
121. See text accompanying notes 138-87 infra.
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I have de'scribed the operation of present law elsewhere. 122 The federal
habeas court must initially determine three threshold questions of state
law: (1) whether there is a state procedural rule requiring criminal defendants to raise federal claims in a fixed manner on pain of forfeiting further
state court opportunities to litigate; (2) whether, if such a rule exists, the
prisoner at bar failed to comply with it; and (3) whether any such noncompliance actually elicited the forfeiture sanction. 123 The court reaches
the federal question-whether the state's procedural ground of decision
will foreclose federal treatment of the underlying claim-only if all three
124
preliminary issues are determined against the petitioner.
This is the status quo. It is hardly impeccable. Federal habeas courts
faced with threshold state law questions are torn between their understandable hesitancy to determine state issues and their rather clear responsibilities
under Noia and Sykes. It is, of course, possible at times to defer to the
judgment of the state courts. 12 The exhaustion doctrine requires habeas
petitioners to bring their federal claims in the state courts, and in the course
of that litigation the state courts may have established whether there is
a state procedural default/forfeiture rule, 126 whether the applicant com128
plied with it,127 and, if not, whether the forfeiture sanction was imposed.
In many instances, however, the record is unclear, and, unless the federal
habeas courts are blindly to accept the respondents' position 129 or attempt
130
in some fashion to abstain in favor of further resort to the state courts,
they must take it upon themselves to determine the vital, albeit local, mat122. L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 84, at 67-79 (Supp. 1982).
123. Id. at 67.
124. Id. at 68-69.
125. The state courts are, of course, authoritative regarding questions of state law.
See Breest v. Perrin, 495 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 655 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1980).
126. In Sykes itself the Court accepted the Florida appellate courts' interpretation of
a state contemporaneous objection rule. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85-86 (1977).
Compare Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 617 (5th Cir.) (holding that in the course
of exhaustion the state courts had already construed the state contemporaneous objection
rule and that the case at bar was not controlled by it), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028 (1981),
with Young v. Sams, 510 F. Supp. 141, 145 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (declining to reexamine
a state court decision that a prisoner's default was controlled by the state contemporaneous
objection rule).
127. See Grieco v. Hall, 641 F.2d 1029, 1032 n.2 (1st Cir. 1981) (relying on a state
court determination); Henson v. Wyrick, 634 F.2d 1080, 1081 (8th Cir. 1980) (deciding
that the state courts had "impliedly" determined the question), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 958
(1981); Brewer v. Overberg, 624 F.2d 51, 53 (6th Cir. 1980) (deferring to a similar state
court judgment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085 (1981); Breest v. Perrin, 495 F. Supp. 287,
290-91 (D.N.H.) (discussing the working analysis), aff'd, 655 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1980).
128. See Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 451 (2d Cir. 1981) (identifying the issue).
129. See White v. Sowders, 644 F.2d 1177, 1180-82 (6th Cir. 1980) (refusing to follow
that course).
130. Cf Alburquerque v. Bara, 628 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1980) (referring to the
district court's attempt to "remand" to the state courts for a determination whether a
prisoner had committed procedural default under state law).
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state
ters in issue. 131 The Supreme Court itself has chosen to determine
33
issues 132 and most lower federal courts have followed suit.'
If the Reagan Administration's purpose were actually to avoid friction with the state courts, it might have proposed the elimination of existing doctrines that force the federal courts to make determinations of state
law. That, in turn, would mean that the federal habeas courts should be
less, not more, deferential to state procedural grounds of decision. For
it is in an attempt to defer to state procedural grounds that the federal
courts are drawn into "making" law with regard to them. The Administration's bill, however, takes an entirely different course, which promises,
on close examination, only to exacerbate the difficulties presented by current law.
The bill would retain the requirement that the federal courts determine at least two state law questions. The operative language of the proposed amendment to section 2244 is triggered by a determination that
the applicant failed to raise a claim at the time or in the manner prescribed by state law. That determination breaks down into two steps. The
federal courts must first determine whether there is any state law requirement that claims be raised at any particular time or in any particular manner. If so, they must determine whether the petitioner at bar actually failed
to meet the state law requirement. Oddly, the proposed bill neglects the
matter of the state law sanction for procedural default and, indeed, may
contemplate that the federal habeas courts should impose a federal
forfeiture
1 34
sanction irrespective of the state law penalty for default.
Such an enactment would drastically alter present law for the worse
and without explanation. While the analysis contemplated by current law
also is engaged by an applicant's apparent procedural default under state
law, federal review is foreclosed only if the state courts actually applied
a state forfeiture rule as the sanction for the petitioner's failure to comply
with state procedural law.1 35 The Administration's bill overlooks the real
possibility that state courts might forgive procedural default and reach
the merits of underlying federal claims. 36 Encouraged by the Supreme
131. The difficulties presented can be perplexing. See, e.g., Granviel v. Estelle, 655
F.2d 673, 678-79 (5th Cir. 1981); White v. Sowders, 644 F.2d 1177, 1181-83 (6th Cir.
1980); Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 358-59 (4th Cir. 1980); Alburquerque v.
Bara, 628 F.2d 767, 772-73 (2d Cir. 1980).
132. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 149-51 (1979) (examining the law of
New York to determine whether there was an applicable procedural default/forfeiture rule).
133. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 84 (Supp. 1982) (collecting and analyzing the many
precedents in the lower courts).
134. Nothing in the accompanying commentary suggests any mitigation in the blanket
rule established in the text of the proposed amendment. See Reform Act, supra note 17,
at 61-82 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of Justice).
135. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979).
136. In many states, procedural default at trial on a constitutional claim does not foreclose
appellate review entirely but only subjects the claim to the local version of the "plain
error" doctrine. E.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 470.15(1) (McKinney 1971). In those
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Court to cut through procedural snarls and to treat the merits of federal
claims whenever possible, the state courts now routinely consider the merits
even when, as a matter of state law, it is open to dismiss them because
of the petitioner's default. 137 When that occurs under current law, federal
habeas corpus review is not precluded. The Administration's bill would
have the federal courts do precisely what the Supreme Court has refused
to direct them to do: accord greater respect to state procedural rules than
the state courts do themselves.
2.

The Adequate-State-Ground Doctrine

Turning from state to federal questions, once again the Reagan
Administration's bill would work to the disadvantage of prisoners presenting what may be meritorious federal claims. As indicated above, present
law contemplates that once threshold state law issues are decided against
the petitioner, the federal habeas court will address the federal question
whether federal review should be foreclosed because of the abortive proceedings in state court.138 Some courts move immediately to the analyses
in Noia or Sykes, asking whether the prisoner's default in state court constituted a "deliberate bypass" of state procedures, 39 or whether there was
"cause" for the default and "prejudice" flowing from the federal error
that went uncorrected. 40 There is, however, an intermediate step between
the anterior state law questions and the posterior inquiries contemplated
by Noia and Sykes. If a state procedural ground is found inadequate to support the state court judgment, the prisoner's default is rendered inconsequential and habeas review on the merits can proceed.' 4 1 In Noia, the Court
circumstances, the appellate courts' authority to overlook procedural default should not
be taken to undercut the very existence of the state's contemporaneous objection rule.
Hockenbury v. Sowders, 633 F.2d 443, 444-45 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981).
A state may require timely actions at trial and encourage compliance with its rule by
means other than a blanket forfeiture sanction. It is necessary in such cases, therefore,
to determine whether the state appellate courts have exercised their authority to overlook
default and denied relief on the merits or, instead, found alleged error insufficiently "plain"
and denied review on the procedural ground. See Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1363
(10th Cir. 1981); cf. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 176-77 (1982) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (arguing that "[gliving effect to an express exception to a contemporaneous
objection rule is hardly inconsistent with that rule" and insisting that there is no need
to undertake the Sykes inquiries if "a jurisdiction has established an exception to its contemporaneous objection requirement and a prisoner's petition for collateral review falls
within that exception").
137. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 84, at 80 n.14.42 (Supp. 1982) (collecting illustrative cases).
138. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979); text accompanying note
122 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 159-66 infra.
140. See text accompanying notes 167-70 infra.
141. See Breest v. Perrin, 655 F.2d 1, 2 n.1 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating that the federal
courts must determine whether a state's asserted procedural ground is "adequate" before
turning to posterior issues identified in Sykes).
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clearly purported to eliminate the adequate-state-ground doctrine from
the habeas context. 142 In Sykes, however, the Court just as clearly resurrected it. 143 The Court did not leap from preliminary questions of local
law to the "cause" and "prejudice" issues, but rather took time to determine whether the procedural ground on which the state relied was adequate and independent-the kind of ground that would have been sufficient to foreclose direct review in the Supreme Court. 14 - That was hardly
surprising. It was one thing to take a step back from Noia and to hold

that, after all, adequate state grounds will preclude habeas review in some
circumstances, but it would have been quite another to take a second step
back and hold that inadequate grounds would also suffice. The Court has
never suggested that a state ground that is insufficient to cut off direct
review can nevertheless preclude collateral attack. In habeas corpus, as
elsewhere, federal review will not be foreclosed until a federal court has
determined, on the peculiar facts of the case at bar, that the procedural
145
ground asserted by the state is adequate for the purpose.

142. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428-34 (1963).
143. L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 82.
144. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977).
145. A state procedural ground can be a constitutionally valid basis in state law on
which a state court judgment unfavorable to the petitioner can rest and, at the same time,
an inadequate basis in federal law to foreclose federal court treatment of underlying federal
claims. That is the theory underlying the line of cases construing statutes that govern
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 454-58
(1958). The Federal Constitution can be violated by arbitrary state procedural rules and
sanctions that serve no legitimate state interests, and in those circumstances the disadvantaged litigant can challenge the imposition of a forfeiture sanction as an independent denial
of due process. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 92-95 (1955). When, however, a state
procedural ground is found only to be inadequate, but not itself unconstitutional, the federal
consequence is that the underlying federal claim that was not, but might have been, adjudicated in state court is open for treatment on the merits in the federal forum. See Henry
v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1965); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291 (1963);
Staub v. Ba-dey, 355 U.S. 313, 318-20 (1958).
The adequacy of a state ground to foreclose federal review of federal claims turns on
a balance of the legitimate state interests served by the imposition of a forfeiture sanction
in the case at bar against the federal interest in the adjudication of what may be meritorious
federal claims for relief. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 472-76 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). While there are dicta in some recent opinions suggesting that any legitimate state
interest will justify preclusion, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 512 n.7 (1978)
(dictum); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 303-08 (1973) (White, J., concurring),
the weight of precedent makes it plain that a more demanding standard is at work. See
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 87 (1955). The analysis is necessarily ad hoc. The federal
courts must search for and identify the precise state interests said to be protected by the
imposition of a forfeiture sanction, judge the actual threat posed to those interests by the
petitioner's action or inaction in state court, and ultimately balance the state's realistic
concerns against the federal interest in the protection of federal r-ghts. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1965). It is not the case, then, that once the federal courts have
found that one state's contemporaneous objection rule proteczs legitimate state interests
in the abstract or that the imposition of a forfeiture sanction as a penalty for noncompliance
in a particular case constituted an adequate state ground, it follows ineluctably that the
same result will be reached in all other cases involving similar rules. But see H. HART
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This is the plan contemplated by Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court in Sykes. It has not been altered by Engle v. Isaac.1 45 At most, Isaac
is ambiguous on the point. While the actual circumstances in each of the
three cases before the Court were confused to some extent, 147 Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court treated each as though the preliminary
state law questions had been resolved in the state's favor and the prisoners
had forfeited their opportunity to litigate federal claims in state court
because of their procedural default at trial. 148 The question at bar was,
then, whether the prisoners could nevertheless raise their claims-that
invalid instructions had been given to the jury-in federal habeas corpus.
Justice O'Connor began with a general recitation of the "costs" of postconviction habeas. 149 Next, however, she became quite specific, focusing on
& H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 133 (Supp. 1981)
(arguing that Sykes "dearly did not follow the Henry approach"). The analysis demands
a serious appraisal of the particular facts of each succeeding case. See, e.g., Sistrunk v.
Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 72-73 (3d Cir. 1981); Hanley v. Rose, 642 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 908 (1981); Young v. Sams, 510 F. Supp. 141, 145-46 (E.D.N.C.
1981).
146. 456 U.S. 107 (1982). Indeed, the opinion in Isaac begins with the statement
that in Sykes the Court held that a state prisoner "barred by procedural default from raising a constitutional claim on direct appeal" cannot litigate that claim in federal habeasabsent a demonstration of "cause" and "prejudice." Id. at 110.
147. Opposing Warden Perini's petition for the writ of certiorari, Respondent Bell argued
that the three cases were inappropriate candidates for Supreme Court review, because
each grew out of tangled Ohio law regarding the burden of proof in self-defense cases.
Brief in Opposition for Respondent Bell at 6-11, Isaac (describing a more complicated
series of actions by the Ohio Legislature and Ohio courts than appears in the Supreme
Court opinion). More important, it seems plain that the gravamen of the prisoners' complaint from the outset was that the courts of Ohio had construed the controlling statute
in a "new" way after their trials, had held that the new construction would have retrospective effect, and still had refused to give these prisoners the benefit of the new construction
because their attorneys had failed to anticipate the change and thus had not entered contemporaneous objections. To be sure, the prisoners came to argue that they had been
denied due process when, in their cases, the burden of proof had been placed on the defense.
That, in turn, led them into the Sykes issues ultimately addressed in the Supreme Court.
In truth, however, they originally had argued primarily that they had not been afforded
the benefits of state law accorded to others similarly situated. The only basis for distinguishing
their cases from those in which state postconviction relief had been granted (on the state
law ground) was their attorneys' failure to object at trial. In effect, the state courts made
the genuine retroactivity of their construction of the new statute turn on the procedural
question. Cf note 260 infra (distinguishing the substantive analysis the Supreme Court
has established for addressing the retrospective application of new federal decisions). If
there was a federal question in this at all, it was the equal protection question whether
Ohio could change the burden of proof in self-defense cases only prospectively. Oral Argument Transcript at 19-20, Isaac(argument of Mr. Kingsley) (making the equal protection
argument on behalf of Isaac.)
148. 456 U.S. at 110.
149. Relying on the discussion in Sykes, Justice O'Connor said that the availability of
federal collateral review "undermines" the finality ofjudgments, "degrades" the "prominence" of the trial itself, and may in some cases "frustrate" the state's interest in punishing
the guilty. Id. at 127-29 & n.33.
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the particular state interests served by state procedural rules requiring
criminal defendants to raise timely objections at trial. 150 Justice O'Connor's discussion of the state interests served by procedural default/forfeiture
rules came before her treatment of posterior inquiries into whether the
prisoners could establish "cause" and "prejudice." Her treatment was,
then, consistent with the thesis that the determination whether an asserted
state procedural ground of decision is adequate must be made in every case.
In fairness, however, the matter is not so clear as that. Justice O'Connor did not set forth in her opinion visible evidence that the Court had
examined the facts of each individual case, appraised the precise effect
of the prisoners' defaults on state interests, and balanced competing
concerns. 5 1 If the Court had dealt straightforwardly with the prisoners'
arguments along those lines, it would have been forced to concede that
in these cases the prisoners' failure to object to jury instructions had not
actually threatened all the interests generally protected by contemporaneous
objection rules. 5 2 The allegedly invalid jury instructions were, after all,
in the record. By failing to object at trial, the prisoners may have reduced
the trial courts' ability to avoid or cure the alleged error. Yet, the state
appellate courts were not deprived of the opportunity to treat the merits
for want of an adequate record. Indeed, at least one of the prisoners in
Isaac argued that the Ohio "plain error" rule would have permitted the
state appellate courts to consider the jury instruction claim because it
153
was visible from the face of the record on appeal.
Then, too, in restating the decision in Sykes, Justice O'Connor

150. Id. at 128. Referring again to Sykes, she pointed out that when defendants fail
to comply with such rules, the state trial court is unable to avoid or cure federal error
on the spot and that the state appellate courts, too, are rendered unable to "mend their
own fences and avoid federal intrusion." Id. at 129.
151. Nor, for that matter, did she say that it had been unnecessary to do that or that
it would be unnecessary in future cases. Still, a failure actually to go through the adequatestate-ground analysis as it is ordinarily understood causes some unsettlement.
152. See note 150 supra.
153. See 456 U.S. at 134. In Isaac, the Court flatly rejected what was viewed as an invitation to "replace or supplement" the Sykes "cause" and "prejudice" analysis with
a "plain error" rule, id., and in a companion case, United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152 (1982), the Court held that the federal "plain error" rule, FED. R. GRIM. PROC.
52(b), is "out of place" in § 2255 proceedings. 456 U.S. at 164. In light of the vehemence
of the Court's language in these two cases, I have to think that the "plain error" arguments
that had previously circulated in the lower courts will now be abandoned. At the same
time, I suspect similar thinking may yet slip into the calculus in a different guise. The
Sykes "cause" and "prejudice" tests also are designed to avoid the very "miscarriage
of justice" against which the "plain error" rule protects persons accused of crime. Id.
at 163 n. 14. It may be, therefore, that plainly prejudicial errors at trial will be reviewable
in collateral proceedings, notwithstanding counsel's failure to enter a timely objection,
though the vehicle for that review will be a finding of "cause" and "prejudice" rather
than "plain error." I have treated elsewhere the various ways in which "plain error"
arguments have been raised in connection with abortive state proceedings. See L. YACKLE,
supra note 6, § 87.1 (Supp. 1982).
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bypassed an opportunity to make it clear that the adequate-state-ground
doctrine remains in place. The state interests generally protected by contemporaneous objection rules, she said, had led the Court in Sykes to hold
that "when a procedural default bars state litigation of a constitutional
claim, a state prisoner may not obtain federal habeas relief absent a showing
of cause and actual prejudice." 54 It is possible that, by the omission, Justice
O'Connor meant to read the adequate-state-ground doctrine out of Sykes
retrospectively. That seems, on balance, unlikely. After going to the trouble
of reviving the doctrine in Sykes, the Court cannot reasonably be understood
to have interred it again in the very next case without so much as mentioning, let alone explaining, its change of heart. The matter is far from
clear, but for the moment the adequate-state-ground doctrine appears to
155
be viable.
The Reagan Administration's bill would eliminate the doctrine entirely
from the habeas corpus context. The proposed subsection (d) fails to mention the doctrine and contemplates, then, that the analysis will move
immediately from preliminary state law questions to the further inquiries
mandated by Sykes. The Justice Department's commentary accompanying the bill makes clear that is precisely the Administration's intention.
It is conceded that, "[u]nfortunately," some of the pages in Sykes can be
read to incorporate the adequate-state-ground doctrine into habeas corpus law.1 5 6 The body of precedent under that rubric is said, however,
' 157
to be "confusing" and its employment in habeas "exceedingly unwise.
The Administration's bill proposes, accordingly, that the standards set
forth in the bill itself will be the "exclusive" criteria by which the federal
58
courts will determine the federal effect of abortive state proceedings.
The proposal to so drastically alter existing law is left without further
defense. Yet, there must be a defense if we are to be persuaded to withdraw
from the prisoners' arsenal one of the few weapons that the Supreme
Court's recent decisions have arguably left there. If the Administration
is to succeed in this vein, it must demonstrate why it is that the federal
habeas courts should defer to inadequate state procedural grounds-bases
of decision that would not prevent the Supreme Court from reaching
underlying federal claims. If the Administration would not object to direct
review in such cases, it must explain its resistance to collateral review.
154. 456 U.S. at 129.
155. I count the companion case, United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982), as
evidence on the point. Before treating the "merits" of the procedural issue in that case,
the Court (still speaking through Justice O'Connor) took time to address the prisoner's
argument that the decision below rested on an interpretation of local District of Columbia
law. Id. at 160-61. While that contention was rejected, it was, at least, considered prior

to justice O'Connor's treatment of the Sykes "cause" and "prejudice" standards as applied
in § 2255 cases. Id. at 162.
156. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 68 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of
Justice).
157. Id.
158. Id.; see text accompanying notes 247-61 infra.
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Otherwise, the cynical explanation defies rebuttal: direct review may be
unobjectionable because it is plain that the Justices lack the physical capacity to accept cases merely to correct errors of federal law. The Administration's ideological commitment to the finality of criminal judgments, even
at the expense of meritorious claims, is not threatened by holding out the
possibility of direct review, which is not practically available.
3.

The Viabilit of Fay v. Noia

Returning to current law, the next analytical step has caused longstanding difficulty. It is plain that some mechanism for deciding whether
to overlook adequate state procedural grounds must be employed, but
15 9
it is far from clear what that mechanism is or should be in habeas cases.
Early on, the Supreme Court experimented with the adequate-state-ground
doctrine itself as the most obvious source of standards. 60 That analysis
was soon discarded, however, and in Noia the Court substituted an alternative approach.1 61 Under the Noia regime, the federal courts had both
the power to overlook any procedural default in state court and the discretion to deny relief to petitioners whose default constituted a "deliberate
62
bypass" of state procedures for litigating the underlying federal claim.'
The standard for determining a "deliberate bypass" was borrowed from
the definition of "waiver." Habeas petitioners were entitled to litigate
their federal claims in habeas unless it was established that they had intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known right or privilege to pursue
relief through further state process. 163 It was clear thfat the Court did not
intend that "bypass" be found often. In fact, the discretion to deny relief
in such cases was recognized only to protect the federal habeas courts from
manipulative applicants who might attempt to abuse the remedy. 64 Further statements that "bypass" would be found only if the applicant personally participated in the decision to forego state process 165 and that the
"waiver" question was a matter of federal law for the federal courts 1 66
underscored the point.
159. See generally L. YACKLE, supra note 6, §§ 71-83 (surveying the Court's several
historical approaches to the problem).
160. See Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 403 (1959); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 TermForeword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 115-22 (1959) (endorsing
that approach).
161. See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L.
REV. 1315, 1368-70 (1961) (anticipating Noia); c Brennan, FederalHabeas Corpusand State
Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 438 (1961) (forecasting the

change).
162. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 76 (1981).
163. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
164. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (relying on the equitable principle that
a suitor's conduct with respect to a case may be the basis for denying relief).

165. Id. at 439.
166. Id. See generally Comment, CriminalWaiver: The Requirements of PersonalParticipation,
Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1262 (1966); Comment, Federal
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By all accounts, the Court's subsequent decision in Sykes altered the
Noia arrangement to some extent. 167 The adequate-state-ground doctrine
was introduced yet again into habeas corpus, and it was held, after all,
that a state procedural ground of decision, which would foreclose direct
review in the Supreme Court, might have that same effect in collateral
proceedings. 68 In addition, the Court in Sykes insisted that state procedural
default/forfeiture rules demanding that criminal defendants raise federal
claims at trial were entitled to more respect than Noia allowed. The "sweeping" language in Noia, which seemed to go "far beyond" the facts of
the case at bar, was rejected in favor of an analysis that the Court said
would place greater stock in the state criminal trial as a "decisive and
portentous event.' 1 69 Since Sykes, prisoners who forfeited state process
because of procedural default at trial have been able to avoid dismissal
in habeas only by establishing "cause" for their failure to comply with
state procedural law and "prejudice" flowing from the alleged violation
70
of federal law that, because of the default, went uncorrected in state court.
Habeas Corpus and the Doctrine of Waiver Through the Deliberate Bypass, of State Procedures, 31
LA. L. REV. 601 (1971).
167. See, e.g., Hill, The Forfeiture of ConstitutionalRights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1050, 1059 (1978); Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural Defaults by
Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REV. 341, 343 (1978); Spritzer, Criminal
Waiver, ProceduralDefault and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 506-08 (1978).
But see Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change
in CriminalProcedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 463 (1980) (suggesting that the departure
may not be so dramatic as some have thought).
168. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 82.
169. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)..
170. Id. at 90-91. In point of fact, the "cause" and "prejudice" standards had first
been applied in prior cases. The Court seized upon those tests in Davis v. United States,
411 U.S. 233 (1973), a case involving an attack on a federal conviction and thus implicating Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Davis the Court drew upon
Rule 12 for the "cause" standard and on precedents for the "prejudice" test, but inexplicably twisted the latter into an additional barrier to postconviction litigation. See id.
at 245. See also Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and
Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 461-63 (1980). It was not sufficient, according to justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, to establish "cause" or "prejudice." It was essential that both be demonstrated before procedural default could be
forgiven.
Next, in Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), the Court imported the "cause"
and "prejudice" rubric into federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. Id. at 542. It remained
in Sykes only to make dear that the new framework would govern all cases in which the
petitioner's procedural default occurred at trial. While a dictum in the unofficial report of
Sumner v. Mata, 101 S.Ct. 764 (1981), once again referred to "cause" or "prejudice"
as sufficient, id. at 769 (dictum), it seems plain enough that the Court did not intend
by that lapse to shift to the disjunctive. Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1364 n.5 (10th
Cir. 1981). Indeed, the error was caught before the official report of Mata was published
449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981) (referring to "cause and prejudice") (emphasis added). When
the prisoners in Isaac attempted to rely on the original language, Brief for Respondent
Bell, Isaac, the Court responded with a clear statement that both "cause" and "prejudice"
must be shown. 456 U.S. at 135.
The Reagan Administration makes no attempt to define "prejudice" after the fashion
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Importantly, however, Sykes did not expressly overrule Noia.17 1 Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion rejected only what he viewed as overbroad
dicta in the earlier case and found no occasion to decide whether the
"deliberate bypass" rule might still apply to "the facts there confronting
the Court."' 172 The extent to which Noia survives Sykes is problematic.
1 73
There is scattered authority for the view that Noia has been jettisoned,
but most courts assume that the "deliberate bypass" analysis continues
to control some cases. The difficulty lies in determining which ones. At
least three explanations have been offered. First, it has been proposed
that Noia still provides the standard in cases in which the procedural default
involved a decision ordinarily made by the defendant personally rather
than by counsel. 174 This is to embrace a kind of "nondelegation" doctrine, by which decision-making authority in the conduct of the defense

of its attempt to "codify" what is "cause" for procedural default. The proposed amendment to § 2244 provides only that federal habeas review is foreclosed unless one or more
of the justifications for "cause" is established and "actual prejudice resulted to the applicant from the alleged denial of the federal right asserted." See text accompanying note
119 supra. The lower courts have been neither uniform nor successful in their treatment
of "prejudice" in the wake of Sykes. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, 5 87. I tend to think
that the difficulty may lie in Davis' awkward separation of the issue from the question
of "cause" in the first instance. On reflection, it still seems that the two ideas overlap
and can be kept distinct for analytical purposes only with great effort. See Hill, The Forfeiture
of ConstitutionalRights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1050, 1088-96 (1978). Indeed,
the tendency of some lower courts to blur the search for "prejudice" with the harmless
error doctrine suggests that we may be on the track toward the elimination of the "prejudice" factor from the Sykes equation altogether. Curiously, the Justice Department's commentary recognizes the trend in the lower courts and embraces it without discussion. Reform
Act, supra note 17, at 64 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of Justice). I have
no objection to raise, but it bears noting that the effect of marrying "prejudice" to harmless
error is to render the former inconsequential. For, if constitutional error, alleged or real,
is judged to be harmless under the Supreme Court's precedents, federal relief will be
withheld in habeas even if procedural default is overlooked, the merits are reached, and
federal error is found. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1972); see Sykes, 433
U.S. at 97-98 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the "prejudice" prong is essentially
meaningless for precisely this reason). Indeed, Justice O'Connor's less-than-tight treatment of the "prejudice" question in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168-69
(1982), suggests a straightforward abandonment of the idea. Looking in that case for "prejudice" flowing from an allegedly invalid jury instruction, she chose as her standard a
formulation that, in Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977), where it was first used,
was intended to describe the requirements for finding a constitutional violation in the
first instance. 456 U.S. at 169. In a real sense, that definition of "prejudice" would
render the entire Sykes analysis irrelevant. In effect, Justice O'Connor reached the merits
and denied relief on that basis.
171. See generally L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 83.
172. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88 n.12.
173. See Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1978); Jimenez v. Estelle,
557 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1978).
174. See Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, ProceduralDefault and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 507-08 (1978).
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is distributed between attorney and client.1 75 Next, it has been proposed
that the "deliberate bypass" analysis from Noia is proper when compliance
with the state's procedural rule would not "improve the setting" in which
the merits of a federal claim can be considered, but the "cause" and "prejudice" standards from Sykes control when compliance would enhance the
76
state courts' alility to adjudicate claims efficiently and seasonably.1
175. Decisions within the defendant's sphere-typically, momentous judgments made
outside the courtroom-are subject to the "deliberate bypass" rule, which asks, in turn,
whether prisoners themselves knowingly waived further state court opportunities for litigation. See text accompanying notes 165-66 supra. Decisions left to counsel-typically, tied
to strategic maneuvering in the heat of trial-are governed by the Sykes "cause" and "prejudice" standards. This explanation makes some sense, demanding as it does a reasoned
judgment by the accused only when that is practicable. Then, too, it enjoys some support
in Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Sykes. 433 U.S. at 92-93 (Burger, CJ.,
concurring). See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 271 n.2 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (insisting that any new doctrine binding the defendant to counsel's defaults
should be limited to situations in which consultation is impractical, as in the "course of
trial"). Its vital flaw, however, is that it calls for a principled basis for distinguishing decisions that are not, or cannot be, delegated to defense counsel. In a system in which a
defendant need not be professionally represented at all, it is most unlikely that we can
develop a satisfactory body of law on the point. See Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9
(1978); cf. Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defendant in
Trial Tactics, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 636, 643 (1977) (treating the problems).
176. See Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1070 (4th Cir. 1980) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The essential thesis is that the real difference between Noia and Sykes, and the basis
for reconciling the two cases, lies in the recognition that federal claims for relief vary in
nature. Some are purely legal and thus can be addressed without elaborative factfinding,
while others depend on allegations outside the record and very much do demand additional evidentiary hearings. In cases involving legal claims, a prisoner's failure to raise
a seasonable objection in state court does not make it more difficult for appellate courts
to reach and determine the merits. In that kind of case the Noia "deliberate bypass"
approach is appropriate. The individual's interest in adjudication on the merits remains
the same, but the state's interest in cutting off further review is diminished. In cases in
which the claim does demand factfinding, however, the state interests are more pronounced.
If prisoners do not raise their claims at trial when essential factfmding can be accomplished
before the evidence becomes stale, the state appellate courts are put at a severe disadvantage.
Appellate courts do not ordinarily conduct hearings. That is the work of trial courts, which,
in this instance, are prevented from performing their ordinary duties by the defendant's
failure to comply with state procedural requirements. The more stringent standards in
Sykes, therefore, are more appropriate determiners of the effect that the default should
be given in the federal forum.
Here, too, there are counterarguments. To begin, it seems clear that most claims require
at least some factfinding. If that is true, this explanation of Noia would render that decision an effective dead letter. More important, this approach may not take account of the
state's interests even in cases in which no factfinding is necessary. Even if it is conceded
that a state appellate court can address the merits of a legal claim notwithstanding the
defendant's failure to raise it below, the fact remains that if the claim is found meritorious,
the judgment will be reversed and the case sent back for another trial. If the defendant
had complied with the state's contemporaneous objection rule in the first instance, the
error might have been avoided or cured at the trial level, obviating the need for further
litigation. See Burton v. Bergman, 649 F.2d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 1981) (Weick, J., dissenting).
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Finally, the weight of authority focuses on the stage of the proceedings
at which the defaults in Noia and Sykes were committed. 177 In Noia, the
prisoner failed to pursue direct review in the state appellate courts out
of fear that, if he succeeded in upsetting his conviction on the ground
that an involuntary confession had been introduced at trial, he might be
tried again and, this time, receive the death penalty. 78 "thedefault did
not occur in the heat of trial but thereafter, in a comparatively calm and
reflective atmosphere in which the prisoner himself might be expected to
participate with counsel in a reasoned decision, which, in turn, might call
for the application of a "waiver" standard. The state interest in imposing a forfeiture sanction at that point was diminished. The trial itself was
over, and there was no longer any opportunity to avoid or cure the error
that allegedly had infected the judgment. 1 79 Nor was the state appellate
court's ability to treat the issue affected by the prisoner's failure to file
a timely notice of appeal. The default in Sykes, on the other hand, did
occur at trial. Counsel did not raise a timely objection to the introduction
of the defendant's inculpating statement.8 0 The circumstances called for
prompt action by counsel-the kind of strategic maneuvering in the courtroom that cannot reasonably involve the client personally. The decision
had to be made quickly as events unfolded.' 8' Moreover, the state interests protected by procedural default/forfeiture rules were at their height.
If counsel in Sykes had complied with the contemporaneous objection rule,
the trial judge might have taken evidence, treated the issue, and avoided
constitutional error entirely.182 Even if the trial judge had reached an erroneous decision on the merits, the judgment might have been reviewable
by the state appellate courts based on the record built below.8 3 In light
of the apparent need for unilateral action by counsel during trial and the
acute state interests presented, it may be appropriate to discourage procedural default at that stage by invoking the comparatively stringent
"cause" and "prejudice" standards.
Most of the courts that have considered the question embrace this
third explanation of Noia and Sykes.' 8 4 The "cause" and "prejudice" stan177. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 83, at 62 (Supp. 1982).

178. 372 U.S. at 440.
179. See Crick v. Smith, 650 F.2d 860, 867-68 (6th Cir. 1981).
180. 433 U.S. at 75.
181. See id. at 94-95 (Stevens, J., concurring).
182. See note 176 supra; cf. Bronstein v. Wainwright, 646 F.2d 1048, 1056 (5th Cir.
1980) (denying relief on merits in part because counsel entered seasonable objection to
prosecutor's jury argument and obtained curative instruction).

183. Cf. Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 640 (2d Cir.) (emphasizing the interest in
developing a record at trial before the evidence becomes stale), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001

(1980).
184. See, e.g., Crick v. Smith, 650 F.2d 860, 867 (6th Cir. 1981); Boyer v. Patton,
579 F.2d 284, 286 (3d Cir. 1978); Ferguson v. Boyd, 566 F.2d 873, 879 (4th Cir. 1977);

cf. Maxwell v. Sumner, 673 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1982) (indicating willingness
to apply Sykes to procedural default at appellate level but finding that in case at bar the
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dards control through the trial, but the "deliberate bypass" analysis continues to govern posttrial defaults.18 5 Here again, however, the Reagan
Administration would have it otherwise. The proposed new subsection
(d) leaves no room in which the "deliberate bypass" analysis might continue to operate, irrespective of the procedural posture in which prisoners'
state court defaults may have occurred.1 86 Indeed, in an apparent effort
to remove all doubts, the justice Department's commentary states explicitly
that the intention is to restrict the federal courts' attention to the standards set forth in the bill, to the exclusion of the "deliberate bypass"
analysis and anything touching "cause" and "prejudice" that is not folded
87
into the bill as written.1

This, to put it bluntly, is insufficient. There are very good and principled reasons for retaining the "deliberate bypass" rule, perhaps in all
state supreme court had reached the merits); Grace v. Butterworth, 635 F.2d 1, 5 n.3
(1st Cir.) (declining to "take sides" in the controversy over whether Noia survives Sykes),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1980); Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 640 & n.8 (2d Cir.)
(distinguishing failures to raise claims on appeal from failures to appeal at all and apparently proposing that Noia applies only to the latter), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1980).
But see Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434, 438 (11th Cir. 1982); Huffman v. Wainwright,
651 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1981).
185. Indeed, in retrospect it appears that Justice Rehnquist's circumspect treatment
of Noia suggested this basis for reconciling the two cases:
Whether [the "cause" and "prejudice" standards] should preclude federal
habeas review of claims not made in accordance with state procedure where the
criminal defendant has surrendered, other than for reasons of tactical advantage, the right to have all of his claims of trial error considered by a state appellate
court, we leave for another day.
The Court in Fay stated its knowing-and-deliberate-waiver rule in language
which applied not only to the waiver of the right to appeal, but to failures to
raise individual substantive objections in the state trial .... We do not choose
to paint with a similarly broad brush here.
433 U.S. at 88 n.2 (emphasis added). The concurring opinions of Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Stevens actually seemed to take affirmative positions on the point. ChiefJustice
Burger insisted that the "deliberate bypass" rule "was never designed for, and is inapplicable to, errors-even of constitutional dimension-alleged to have been committed
during trial." Id. at 91-92 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Stevens, for his part, argued
that the Noia analysis never had been applied successfully in cases in which the procedural
default occurred at trial and offered his doubts that it would be realistic to demand that
defendants themselves participate in the tactical decision whether to object to evidence
as it is offered during adversary proceedings in the courtroom. Id. at 94-95 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). In the end, it seems plain that Noia survives Sykes and is applicable, under
present case law, to procedural defaults after the relative frenzy of trial has subsided.
186. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
187. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 67-58 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't
ofJustice). While the commentary recognizes ChiefJustice Burger's signals that Noia continues to govern decisions "that are ordinarily made by the defendant rather than his
attorney, such as the decision whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, take the witness stand,
or pursue an appeal," the commentary urges Congress to read those comments as
"understandable . . . judicial restraint" in dealing with a case that the full Court had
not yet overruled rather than as a sincere effort to find a place for Noia in contemporary
law. Id.
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cases, but certainly in those in which the lower courts continue to apply
it routinely. The Administration seizes on one of three bases for reconciling Noia with Sykes-the proposition that Noia still controls decisions
characteristically made by defendants personally' "8-and makes no genuine effort to counter even that with reasoned argument.189 Other explanations for the two cases-those actually relied upon by the lower courtsare not mentioned. This suggests more than poor research. Once again,
the Administration proposes drastic curtailment of the availability of habeas
without an adequate explanation of the basis for change. And, again, it
appears that the same ideological resistance to the very existence of the
postconviction writ is the motivating factor.
4.

The Meaning of "Cause"

In those cases in which Sykes provides the standards for determining
whether an adequate state procedural ground will foreclose federal habeas
review, prisoners are entitled to litigate their federal claims in federal court
only if they establish "cause" for their default in state court and "prejudice" resulting from the errors of federal law, which form the basis of
their complaint. The Court said in Sykes that the new standards were "narrower" than the "deliberate bypass" test in Noia, but left the precise mean190
ing of "cause" and "prejudice" for elaboration in future decisions.
More recently, the Court in Isaac again resisted fixed definitions. "Cause"
and "prejudice" are not, then, "rigid concepts" but "take their meaning from the principles of comity and finality."' 191 Indeed, in Y'appropriate"
cases they will "yield to the imperative of a fundamentally unjust
incarceration."1 92 Seen in this reflected light, the new standards serve essentially the same purpose as the "deliberate bypass" test that preceded them.
The objective is a procedural system in which legitimate state interests
are protected from manipulation by litigants bent on pursuing their own
interests at all costs. The Court has abandoned, to be sure, the "waiver"93
standard, but it has not embraced an "airtight system of forfeitures."'1
The key concept is "cause," which must be read to mean94some fair explanation for the petitioner's procedural default at trial.1
The new analysis will not saddle blameless criminal offenders with
188. See text accompanying notes 174-175 supra.
189. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 67 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of

Justice).
190. 433 U.S. at 87.
191. 456 U.S. at 135.

192. Id.
193. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 432 (1963).
194. The further matter of "prejudice" is important but comparatively less so. See note

170 supra. I should say in passing that I am prepared for now to take the Court at its

word. The "cause" and "prejudice" standards, I take it, are not a sham to conceal a

cynical withdrawal of habeas review without accepting the responsibility for it. The Court
says its new approach is designed to, and will, avoid the "miscarriage of justice." Sykes,
433 U.S. at 91. I accept that at face value-for now.
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responsibility for the mistakes of defense counsel. In the interest of procedural regularity and the finality ofjudgments, the new analysis will bind
defendants to counsel's deliberate, strategic maneuvers at trial. But there
will be no wholesale refusal by the federal courts to entertain claims when
counsel's default was not tactical but, instead, was the product of ignorance,
negligence, or worse. This is only realistic, because our theoretical expectations in the criminal justice system are rarely met in state courtrooms.
State criminal procedure codes contemplate that criminal defendants will
be professionally represented and that, accordingly, they will be able to
thread their way through complex proceedings, always pursuing a defense
strategy groomed to the demands of the particular case, but at the same
time conscious of the need to build an adequate record for legal argument
should the trial end in conviction. That is why it is supposed to be both
reasonable to establish contemporaneous objection rules that prevent
imaginative counsel from manipulating the process and just to enforce
such rules with the forfeiture sanction. In reality, however, poorly prepared,
under-financed, and inexperienced defense attorneys are unable to render
that kind of representation. The consequence is a landslide of procedural
defaults. 195 The very premise upon which procedural default/forfeiture rules
are based is belied by practical evidence available to anyone with eyes to see.
For thirty years or more, postconviction habeas corpus has bridged
the gap between the antiseptic expectations and demands of state criminal
procedure codes and the obvious shortfalls in state courtrooms. If the states
recognize the difficulties faced by criminal defendants and forgive their
lawyers' procedural defaults, so much the better. If they do not, the federal
habeas courts stand ready to look behind counsel's mistakes and treat the
merits of underlying federal claims that were not, but might have been,
raised earlier. 196 This has always been a crucial function of the federal
writ. While the standards for exercising the federal courts' power have
changed, at least with regard to cases involving trial-level defaults, the
essential function served by postconviction habeas has not. The Court's
cases, Sykes and Isaac in particular, should be read in this light. 197 As the
195. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1973)
(stating that he had been told that, if his court were to reverse in every case in which
ineffective assistance of counsel could be demonstrated, half the cases on the docket would
have to be sent down).
196. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
197. Just as it was clear under the regime established in Noia that the federal habeas
courts must hold evidentiary hearings to determine whether procedural defaults constituted
a deliberate bypass of state remedies, 372 U.S. at 439, it is equally clear that hearings
are necessary to make the "cause" determination within the meaning of Sykes. SeeJenkins
v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234 n.1 (1980). The reasons for counsel's failure to raise
claims at trial are characteristically tied to the peculiar circumstances at work in each
case. And it is those reasons that the "cause" inquiry is designed to identify and evaluate.
Chief Justice Burger's treatment of the issue in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981),
is illustrative. The warden in Smith argued that the petitioner had "waived" his fifth amendment claim, because defense counsel had not objected to the introduction of a psychiatrist's
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following discussion indicates, "cause" should always be found when
counsel's default was unintentional and should sometimes, but not always,
198
be found when counsel acted deliberately.
The first of these propositions follows logically from Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Sykes. While, to be sure, there is language
in that opinion setting down other quarrels with Noia,199 the primary focus
was on the tendency of the "deliberate bypass" test to encourage "sandbagging' '-the practice of withholding federal claims in state court for
some tactical advantage.2 0 0 The strategy is "intentionally to build constitutional error into a criminal prosecution, to hope that the client will
be acquitted anyway, but then to be prepared to raise the federal claim
later in habeas corpus if the client should instead be convicted.' '201 In
testimony on that ground. Id. at 468 n. 12. Chief Justice Burger rejected the argument
both because the warden had not raised it in his petition for certiorari and thus had himself
committed procedural default, and "[f]or the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals."
Id. The Fifth Circuit had undertaken an investigation into the circumstances of the alleged
default. The record showed that counsel, in fact, had raised a contemporaneous objection
to the psychiatrist's testimony. The default, if any, lay in his failure to assert constitutional grounds for the objection. Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 n.19 (5th Cir. 1979),
aff'd, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
The Fifth Circuit answered the warden's procedural default claim on three levels. Again,
the warden had committed procedural default of his own by failing to complain of the
petitioner's default until after the federal hearing below. The district court had been unwilling to entertain the argument at that point and, indeed, had considered the matter
"waived." The circuit, for its part, was "not disposed to disagree." Id. More important,
it was plain that if counsel had asserted constitutional grounds in his motion, the effort
would have been "futile." Under the precedents controlling at the time, the trial judge
would have dismissed the federal claim summarily. On this "futility" ground, too, counsel's
default could be "excuse[d]." Id. Finally, the surprise witness had thrown defense counsel
off balance. According to the circuit court, counsel could "scarcely be faulted for failing
to enumerate all of the many constitutional rights that the state violated when it unexpectedly
presented [the] testimony." Id. The Supreme Court's treatment of "futility" in Isaac,
accordingly, must be read against the background of the treatment given that argument
in Smith and the way in which the habeas court there examined the peculiar facts before
coming to a judgment regarding the state's procedural default contentions. See text accompanying notes 215-22 infra.
198. Once again, the Court's decision in Estelle v. Smith. 451 U.S. 454 (1981), is
instructive. Of the three bases accepted by the Court as grounds for rejecting the warden's
procedural default claim, id. at 468 n. 12, two are most significant. To the extent counsel's
default was excused because an objection on federal grounds would have been "futile,"
Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 n.19 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 451 U.S. 454 (1981),
it appears that "cause" may be found in some cases even when counsel acted deliberately
in withholding a federal claim in state court. See text accompanying notes 243-46 infra.
At the same time, inasmuch as counsel's surprise also justified his failure to state federal
grounds, it seems that unintentional defaults, too, may be forgiven. The true meaning
of "cause" thus is not to be determined simply by distinguishing intentional from unintentional procedural defaults. That rough classification helps, however, to organize a more
complex discussion that promises a greater measure of clarity in this field.
199. 433 U.S. at 87-89.
200. Id. at 89.
201. Yackle, Book Review, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 479, 499 (1981).
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all fairness, such tactics are not detectable in the run of criminal cases. 202
The very concept of "sandbagging" may be fanciful, owing more to the
abstractions that concern legislative draftsmen than experience in the
criminal courts. 20 3 Accepting the Court's concern at face value, however,
it is at once apparent that "sandbagging" is a deliberate, tactical undertaking. When defense counsel maneuver for strategic advantage, it may
be justifiable for courts to invoke the forfeiture sanction in order to
discourage manipulation. The same hardly holds true when counsel commit default out of ignorance or negligence. Lawyers do not have to be
threatened with loss of further opportunities to litigate claims of which
2 04
they are unaware.
It is also apparent that the maneuvering identified as "sandbagging"
in Sykes is actually a subset of deliberate stratagems in general. For, again,
Sykes condemned Noia for encouraging "sandbagging." Inasmuch as Noia
itself held that the "deliberate bypass" of state procedures would foreclose
federal habeas review, the only understanding of the discussion in Sykes
that makes sense is that "sandbagging" describes counsel's intentional
defaults only when the client is unaware of the strategy.2 0 5 That kind of
behavior perhaps was encouraged by Noia, which limited "deliberate
bypass" to cases in which the defendant personally participated in the
decision knowingly to forego further state process. 20 6 The difference between
what is required for "deliberate bypass" under Noia and for "cause" within
the meaning of Sykes is, in turn, the difference between cases in which
the defendant knowingly participated in the decision to withhold a federal
claim and those in which counsel acted alone. I come away with the view
that "[t]he departure from Noia accomplished in Sykes is limited to the
personal participation prong of the 'deliberate bypass' rule." 20 7 If "sandbagging," as it is described in Sykes, genuinely is the evil to which the
"cause" standard is addressed, unintentional procedural defaults should
always be excused. Deliberate defaults, even those committed without the
defendant's knowledge and participation, can cut off federal review, at
least in some cases. Unintentional defaults can never have that effect.
If further support is needed, it can be found in Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court in Isaac.208 Counsel had failed to enter a contem202. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dismissing the idea of "sandbagging" as unrealistic); see also Committee on Civil Rights: Pending Legislation to Amend the
Federal Habeas Corpus Statutes, 35 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 124, 135 (1980) (stating that

court-appointed trial lawyers rarely continue to represent defendants beyond trial stage
and, accordingly, are unlikely to pursue trial strategy that looks forward to habeas review).

203. See note 195 supra.
204. See Myers v. Washington, 646 F.2d 355, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1981) (unreasonable
to expect attorneys to raise all objections or to anticipate evolution of constitutional law).

205. Yackle, Book Review, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 479, 499-500 (1981).
206. See text accompanying note 165 supra.

207. L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 86, at 94 (Supp. 1982).
208. I suspect that some people will read Isaac to undercut the understanding of "cause"

that I have gleaned from Sykes. That, I think, is unwarranted. Indeed, it seems to me
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poraneous objection to a jury instruction, which, consistent with the controlling Ohio statute as it was then understood, placed the burden of
establishing self defense on the defendant. Ten months after the Isaac trial,
the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Robinson, 20 9 construed the self defense
statute to place only the burden of production on the defendant.2 10 Once
the defendant adduced some evidence on the point, the prosecution was
required to disprove self defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 211 After Robinson, the prisoners in Isaac sought collateral relief. They alleged, first, that
their juries had not been instructed consistent with the statute as construed
in Robinson, and, second, that Ohio had violated the fourteenth amendment by placing the burden of proving self defense on the accused.2 12 In
the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor declined to treat the first claim,
finding it to be essentially a matter of state law not cognizable in federal
habeas corpus. 213 She found the second claim to be at least arguable,
forfeiture
however, and thus turned to the question whether the prisoners'
214
in state court would foreclose federal review as well.

The prisoners made two arguments in support of their position that
"cause" should be found for their attorneys' default at trial. First, they
contended that, in light of pre-Robinson case law, it was clear at the time
of trial that the jury instruction would be sustained if challenged and that,
accordingly, any objection would have been "futile." 215 An amicus brief
that Justice O'Connor was at pains to avoid a far-reaching redefinition of "cause." 456
U.S. at 135 (reiterating that "cause" is not a "rigid" concept and declining to further
characterize it). I certainly do not read Justice O'Connor's footnote 34 to conclude the
question. In the course of collecting the "costs" of postconviction habeas in the federal
system, she noted that trial-stage defaults by defense counsel deprive the state court of
an opportunity to avoid or cure error on the spot. Id. at 129. "Counsel's default," she
said, "may stem from simple ignorance or the pressures of trial." Id.at n.34. Next,
however, she recalled that in Sykes the Court had noted that defense counsel may
"deliberately" withhold claims "in order to 'sandbag'-to gamble on acquittal while saving
a dispositive claim in case the gamble doesn't pay off." Id. The footnote speaks for itself.
Justice O'Connor recognizes, as anyone must, that some defaults are unintentional. She

scarcely proposes that defaults of that kind will cut off federal postconviction review. Rather,
she turns immediately to an entirely different kind of default-the "sandbagging" on

which the Court frowned in Sykes. I read the footnote not to suggest that all defaults will
be treated the same, but to single out some deliberate stratagems for forfeiture penalties.
209. 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976).
210. Id.at 113, 351 N.E.2d at 95.
211. Id.at 110, 113, 351 N.E.2d at 93, 95.
212. 456 U.S. at 115, 121. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process
clause demands that prosecution prove all elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt).
213. 456 U.S. at 120-21.
214. Id.at 125.
215. Id. at 130, see Brief for Respondent Bell at 51-54, Isaac. The prisoners themselves
understood this argument to comprehend cases in which counsel was unaware that a claim
was available. Id. at 54 (insisting that there was "nothing in the record to suggest that
any alleged procedural default was based upon the type of decision-making posited by
the Solicitor General").

HABEAS CORPUS
by the United States labelled that argument a frontal attack on Sykes. 216
In essence, the prisoners hoped to justify counsel's deliberate choice to
withhold a claim simply because it appeared that the claim would be
unsuccessful. That kind of decision, according to the government, is no
different from any other strategic judgment by counsel at trial. And
by counsel are not, ordinarily, sufficient to constitute
deliberate21choices
"cause." 7 The Court disposed of the "futility" argument summarily:
We note at the outset that the futility of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for a failure
to object at trial. If a defendant perceives a constitutional claim
and believes it may find favor in the federal courts, he may not
bypass the state courts simply because he thinks they will be
unsympathetic to the claim. Even a state court that has previously
rejected a constitutional argument may decide, upon reflection,
that the contention is valid. Allowing criminal defendants to
deprive the state courts of this opportunity would contradict the
218
principles supporting Sykes.
Clearly, in this passage Justice O'Connor addressed only deliberate
decisions to withhold claims thought to be "futile. ' 219 Even at that, use

216. The brief states:
A majority of the Sixth Circuit has held that the assumed futility of making
a timely objection to assertedly erroneous jury instructions is sufficient to excuse
an otherwise dispositive procedural default. Indeed, the court of appeals seems
to have held that the apparent futility of objection is sufficient to excuse a procedural default, without regard to the actual reason for the default, since it never
inquired whether respondents' trial counsel in fact withheld objection because
it was deemed futile.
The major premise of... Wainwright v. Sykes ...

is the "familiar" princi-

ple ... that rights may be lost, even in criminal cases, by failure to assert them
in a timely fashion ....
This Court left open for resolution in future cases the precise definition of
"cause." The Sixth Circuit's decision in this case virtually denies the term any
content at all. . . . While an attorney's judgment that a particular claim is
unpromising and therefore not worth making arguably constitutes a deliberate
bypass, according to the Sixth Circuit that same decision is sufficient "cause"
to excuse the procedural default.
In light of the forfeiture principle, upon which the decision in Wainwright rests,
and the reasons stated for adopting the cause and prejudice standard, the assumed
futility of objection cannot constitute sufficient "cause" to excuse a procedural
default.
Brief for the United States (typescript draft) at 10-11, Isaac. See also id. at 23-24 (arguing
that if "cause" can be established by demonstrating a reason for intentional procedural
default, the Sykes standard would be "more lenient" than the "deliberate bypass" rule
from Noia, which cuts off deliberate refusals to invoke state procedures).
217. Id. at 10-11. But see text accompanying notes 243-46 infra.
218. 456 U.S. at 130.
219. Her footnotes drove the point home. She quoted justice Powell's concurring opinion in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), to the effect that counsel for the defense
could not be allowed "deliberately to forego objection to a curable trial defect," id. at 515
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of the term "alone" left open the possibility that the dim prospects for
an objection might yet play some subordinate role in the determination
of "cause." 220 Indeed, Justice O'Connor mentioned later in her opinion
that the Court "might hesitate to adopt a rule that would require trial
counsel . . . to object to every aspect of the proceedings in the hope that
some aspect might mask a latent constitutional claim." 22' Any blanket
refusal to consider the apparent "futility" of a claim would almost certainly signal conscientious counsel to raise "every conceivable constitutional challenge that might some day be accepted-and thus overload their
briefs with unmeritorious issues.' '222 The "futility" argument is, and must
be, alive for the moment. In any event, I count the discussion of it in
Isaac to be entirely consistent with the understanding of "cause" described
above.
The prisoners' second contention was that, at the time an objection
might have been entered, counsel had not known that a constitutional
challenge to the jury instruction was available. 223 The Court's treatment
of this second argument raises more, but not insuperable, difficulties for
the thesis I want to defend. The Court's actual holding was not disconcerting. Counsel's inability to anticipate Robinson went only to state law claims
not cognizable in the federal forum. That argument, even if sound, was
dismissed on a jurisdictional basis. 224 With respect to the acknowledged
federal claim that the jury instruction ran afoul of the fourteenth amendment, Justice O'Connor examined the record and concluded that this constitutional claim was available at the time of trial. The progenitor case,
Winship, was already on the books and had been relied on by other counsel
to challenge.jury instructions. 225 That being true, Justice O'Connor could
reject the Isaac prisoners' argument without deciding "whether the novelty
226
of a constitutional claim ever establishes cause for a failure to object."
Indeed, in passing she offered that here, too, the Court might hesitate
to adopt a rule that would require trial counsel to "exercise extraordinary
vision." 227 That, of course, would lead to precisely the difficulty a blanket
rejection of the "futility" argument would present-the encouragement
of frivolous claims.

(emphasis added), and reminded the prisoners that even Noia condemned the "deliberate
bypass" of state remedies. 456 U.S. at 130 nn. 35-36.
220. 456 U.S. at 130. In another case, perhaps one more closely resembling Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), in which the Court apparently embraced a more favorable

treatment of the "futility" argument, see notes 197-98 supra, a different result might yet
be reached.
221. 456 U.S. at 131.
222. Myers v. Washington, 646 F.2d 355, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1981).
223. 456 U.S. at 130-31; see Brief for Respondent Bell at 54-57, Isaac.
224. 456 U.S. at 131.
225. Id. at 131-33 & n.42.

226. Id. at 131.
227. Id.
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Further language must be examined, however, for whatever light it
may shed on the Court's intentions regarding "cause." After concluding
that counsel in these cases had the "tools" with which to construct their
constitutional challenge to the jury instruction, 228 Justice O'Connor offered
the following general comments:
We do not suggest that every astute counsel would have relied
upon Winship to assert the unconstitutionality of a rule saddling
criminal defendants with the burden of proving an affirmative
defense. Every trial presents a myriad of possible claims. Counsel
might have overlooked or chosen to omit respondents' due process argument while pursuing other avenues of defense. We have
long recognized, however, that the Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney.
It does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise
every conceivable constitutional claim. Where the basis of a constitutional claim is available, and other defense counsel have
perceived and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and
finality counsel against labelling alleged unawareness of the objec229
tion as cause for a procedural default.
It is an understatement to say that this paragraph is ambiguous: it is confusing if not confused. Read against the background of the prisoners' briefs
in Isaac, however, it begins to make some sense. The difficulty, at bottom, is that the paragraph addresses two analytically distinct matters
without explaining when it has left the one for the other.
In addition to the "futility" argument, the prisoners identified two
further bases for "cause": first, the ineffective assistanceof counsel for failure
to comprehend and raise the due process claim at trial, and, second, the
inadvertenceof counsel, short of ineffectiveness in the sixth amendment sense,
but demonstrated nonetheless by the same failure to recognize and raise
a federal claim in season.23 0 If, at the time of trial, the law was clear enough
to put competent counsel on notice of a due process claim, then, in the
absence of evidence that there was some tactical motivation behind the
default, counsel's failure to raise the claim constituted ineffective assistance.
While the meaning of "cause" may be unclear at the fringes, no one has
proposed that ineffective assistance of counsel, tied directly to the procedural default in issue, will not suffice. 23 1 Even if the law was not so
dear, if it was still apparent to perceptive lawyers and there was no strategic
basis for withholding the claim, counsel's inadvertence in overlooking it
228. Id. at 131-33. See also id. at 131 n.37 (recalling that at oral argument the state
had not insisted on a blanket ruling that the novelty of a claim can never justify a determination of "cause" but had only urged that "cause" should not be found when "the
tools are available to construct the argument").
229. Id. at 133-34.
230. Brief for Respondent Bell at 50, 54-57, Isaac.
231. See Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1978); Jiminez v.
Estelle, 557 F.2d 506, 511 (5th Cir. 1977); L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 86.
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should constitute "cause."

23 2

Inasmuch as ineffective assistance of counsel

amounts to an independent constitutional violation entitling a prisoner
to relief in habeas, a rule limiting "cause" to cases in which the sixth
amendment was violated would render Sykes a "nullity.' '233 It is only
reasonable to suppose that "cause" can be based on circumstances falling short of ineffective assistance. If it were otherwise, the procedural default
cases would be collapsed into substantive sixth amendment law and it would
no longer be necessary, in most cases at least, to cut through default and
reach the merits of underlying federal claims .234
The quoted passage from Justice O'Connor's opinion responds to

232. Brief for Respondent Bell at 54, Isaac.
233. Id. See also Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1364 (10th Cir. 1981) (making it
clear that one need not establish a sixth amendment violation to demonstrate "cause");
White v. Sowders, 644 F.2d 1177, 1184 (6th Cir. 1980) (some instances of poor performance, short of a sixth amendment violation, will satisfy "cause" requirement); Jurek v.
Estelle, 593 F.2d 672, 683 n.19 (5th Cir. 1979) (the misfeasance need not amount to a
denial of defendant's constitutional right to counsel). There are cases on the books in
which "cause" seems to have been equated with ineffective assistance. E.g., United States
v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981); Indiviglio
v. United States, 612 F.2d 624, 631 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 933 (1980).
And the Solicitor General has proposed that the two ideas be run together. Brief for the
United States at 34 & n.27, United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). Yet, I have
located no articulated response to the analysis in the text.
234. There are cases in which this may not be true. If, for example, ,the underlying
claim that went unconsidered because of counsel's default was an argument that trial was
absolutely barred under the jeopardy clause, the relief would be release with prejudice
to a new trial. Grandberry v. Bonner, 653 F.2d 1010, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981); Klobuchir
v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 966, 967 (3d Cir. 1981); see L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 63,
at 46-52 (Supp. 1982). In that kind of case, relief on an ineffective assistance ground would
not suffice, because retrial would be available. Of course, counsel for the defense in new
proceedings would presumably raise the jeopardy clause claim, and the prisoner would,
if successful on that claim, still avoid retrial.
The proposition in the text was met in Isaac itself by a deceptively simple syllogism.
Brief for Petitioners at 14, Isaac. At least in a change-of-law case, a holding that unintentional default always supports a finding of "cause" would, according to the state, relieve
counsel from "any obligation to attempt to change the law" and would remove any possibility that default will foreclose federal review. "Presumably if the objection is well known,
the failure to make it will be deemed ineffectiveness of counsel .... On the other hand,
if the objection is not perceived until a subsequent decision is rendered, then 'cause' is
found in the lack of anticipation." Id. There must be, according to this analysis, some
middle ground between defaults that bring relief on a sixth amendment ground and those
that are excused under Sykes. That ground is occupied by unintentional defaults that fall
short of a sixth amendment violation but still work a forfeiture of further litigation. Oral
Argument Transcript at 9, Isaac (argument of Mr. Karas). The syllogism is fundamentally
flawed. It is unlikely that a single default at trial, standing alone, will constitute ineffective assistance in the sixth amendment sense. See notes 236-38 infra and accompanying
text. That being true, there are many instances in which counsel's deliberate defaults will
not justify a finding of "cause," and no "middle ground" between sixth amendment
violations and innocent mistakes needs to be recognized, within which unintentionaldefaults
will cut off federal review. The concept of "cause" has ample room in which to operate,
even if only counsel's deliberate maneuvers have that effect.
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both contentions. 235 The first five sentences address the prisoners' argument that counsel in Isaac rendered ineffective assistance. Justice O'Connor explains that while the due process claim was known at the time of
trial, counsel's failure to object did not violate the sixth amendment. As
a general matter, the effectiveness of counsel is measured by a lawyer's
performance taken as a whole. 236 The analysis takes account of, but does
not focus on, an isolated instance in which counsel acted in a way that
later, in different circumstances, seems on reflection to have been unwise
or even mistaken. 23 7 Only rarely are constitutional claims so clear and
so fundamental that a failure to raise them would constitute ineffectiveness
standing alone. 238 Even in hypotheticals presenting the most likely candidates, there may be tactical grounds for the strategy that prevent a determination of ineffective assistance. 239 Justice O'Connor's five sentences,
then, only repeat what the Court has said on numerous occasions. The
sixth amendment argument is rejected, as well it might be against the
factual background of the full proceedings in state court.
In the last sentence of the paragraph, Justice O'Connor moves beyond
the prisoners' sixth amendment claim and treats their second argumentthat, even if counsel's representation satisfied sixth amendment standards
overall, their inadvertence in failing to identify and raise the claim should
constitute "cause." Here, her previous holding that the Winship argument was available is controlling. While the prisoners complain that their
lawyers were not aware that the jury instruction was subject to constitutional challenge, Justice O'Connor, in all candor, refuses to believe it.
In light of previous precedents, the arguments made by lawyers in other
cases, and a growing literature on the point, these attorneys cannot persuasively contend that they did not know. This is critical. In referring
to the Isaac prisoners' argument, Justice O'Connor does not deal explicitly
with cases in which counsel were, in fact, unaware of claims that might
later be accepted as meritorious. She addresses and rejects only the argu-

235. See text accompanying note 229 supra.
236. See Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 1981) (collecting illustrative
cases).
237. Justice O'Connor's references to the possibility that counsel may have "overlooked"
a claim while pursuing "other avenues of defense," 456 U.S. at 133-34, hardly qualify
as evidence that she would decline to find "cause" when an attorney's default was
unintentional.
238. See Lumpkin v. Ricketts, 551 F.2d 680, 681 (5th Cir. 1977). Compare Mylar v.
Alabama, 671 F.2d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that counsel's failure to file a
brief on appeal constituted ineffective assistance standing alone), with Knott v. Mabry,
671 F.2d 1208, 1213-14 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding fault with counsel's cross-examination
of an expert witness but declining to conclude that on that ground alone the petitioner
had been denied effective assistance). On the other hand, procedural default is surely a
relevant factor. See Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1368 (10th Cir. 1981) (Logan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lucey v. Seabold, 645 F.2d 547, 547 (6th
Cir. 1981); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
239. See Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434, 443 (11th Cir. 1982) (collecting authorities).
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ment in these cases and against this background that the "alleged"
unawareness of counsel should constitute "cause.

' 240

What she or the

full Court will be prepared to accept in other cases, in which the case
for counsel's ignorance is stronger, remains entirely open. This understanding is reinforced by Justice O'Connor's comment that the Court might
hesitate to adopt a rule that requires counsel to exercise "extraordinary
vision. "241 Lawyers are professionals, not mystics.

24

2

240. 456 U.S. 131-34. I confess some hesitancy myself regarding this analysis
of the key paragraph in Isaac. If factual ignorance will justify a determination of "cause"
in future cases, it seems that in these cases the prisoners should have been permitted to
put their trial lawyers on the stand in a federal evidentiary hearing and to elicit from
them testimony that they genuinely did not know of the claim at the time of trial. See,
e.g., Hicks v. Scurr, 671 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1982) (relying on affidavits); Rachel
v.-Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 204 (6th Cir. 1978) (relying on affidavits). That testimony,
in turn, could be underscored by the point, included in the prisoners' briefs in the Supreme
Court, that no strategic advantage was to be gained by intentionally withholding the claim
at trial. It seems precipitous at best for the Supreme Court itself to find counsel's protestations unbelievable in advance of an opportunity, in a hearing, for judging their
credibility.
In the Court's defense, however, it may be noted that the examination of defense counsel
in collateral evidentiary hearings has always been a bit artificial. See Kuhl v. United States,
370 F.2d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1966) (pointing out that counsel may be placed in the position
of "hurting" the former client by explaining defaults on some tactical basis). If counsel
in Isaac were to take the stand and give evidence favorable to the prisoners, they must
by hypothesis affirm what can now be only embarrassing-that they honestly did not know
what the Supreme Court has now concluded they should have known. If, on the other
hand, they were to attempt any kind of self-vindication, see Washington v. Strickland,
673 F.2d 879, 886-87 (5th Cir. 1982) (canvassing defense counsel's description of his trial
strategy), they would necessarily disserve their former clients' current claims. It may be
that the Court wishes to avoid placing counsel in such a position, and it is for that reason
that further evidentiary hearings were not ordered. But see Oral Argument Transcript at
44-45, Isaac (argument of Mr. Aynes) (explicitly requesting a hearing on behalf of respondent Bell). All the same, in other cases in which an argument for genuine ignorance is
stronger, hearings presumably will be necessary. See, e.g., Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359,
1364 (10th Cir. 1981); Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 132 (8th Cir. 1981); Mendiola v.
Estelle, 635 F.2d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1981).
241. 456 U.S. at 131.
242. In this regard, I admit of some concern regarding Justice O'Connor's treatment
of an alternative ground for the circuit's judgment in Isaac. The original panel in that
case had not decided that counsel's assumed inability to anticipate the federal claim constituted "cause" for failing to raise it at trial, but rather that Syes was simply inapplicable
to a "change in the law" case. Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1122, 1127 (6th Cir. 1980).
There was solid support for that view in prior case law. See L. YACKLE, supra note 6,
§ 85, at 341-43 (1981) (developing the analysis). According to the panel, the very purpose
of the contemporaneous objection rule in Ohio was to establish an incentive for raising
claims at the time when error might be avoided or cured. The rule "presuppose[d] the
contemporaneous existence of some legal principle that [was] applicable to the proceedings
at trial." 646 F.2d at 1126. Accepting the premise that in Isaacthere was no existing principle, the panel found it irrational to apply the state procedural default/forfeiture rule.
That line of argument ran full tilt into the Supreme Court's notorious dictum in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), implying that states might protect themselves
from new, but retrospectively applicable, principles simply by invoking their procedural
default/forfeiture rules. Id. at 244 n.8 (dictum). The panel, however, would not bend
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The thesis that unintentional procedural default will always support
a finding of "cause" thus emerges from Isaac unscathed and even
strengthened. Next, it is necessary to identify the deliberate defaults that
will also suffice. Intentional trial maneuvers for tactical advantage, in the
main, must be excluded. If the "sandbagging" problem identified in Sykes
enjoys any currency at all, counsel's strategic failure to assert a federal
claim in anticipation of some tactical benefit to the client will not justify
a finding of "cause," even if the defendant did not know of and personally
participate in the decision to forego state process. Unless, of course,
counsel's "sandbagging" constitutes ineffective assistance, 243 the forfeiture
sanction will be imposed in order to discourage the practice. 244 There are,
however, other deliberate defaults that cannot be discouraged in the same
way and, for that reason, should elicit more tolerance. If, for example,
counsel withheld a claim because it would have offended the trial judge
or prejudiced the client before the jury in some illegitimate way, "cause"
should be found even though the default was committed intentionally,
with full understanding of state law and the consequences thereunder for
to Hankerson and, indeed, labelled as "arbitrary and capricious" any attempt by Ohio
to deny the benefit of the new principle to prisoners who had failed to raise it only because,
at the time they were tried, it had not yet been recognized. 646 F.2d at 1125.
Commentators have criticized Hankerson. See Hill, The Forfeiture of ConstitutionalRights
in Criminal Cases, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 1050, 1078 n.160 (1978) (suggesting that the dictum will not "long commend itself' to the Court). Other lower courts have divided on
the issue. Compare Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1980) (relying on Hankerson), with Myers v. Washington, 646 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1981) (declining to invoke the
Hankerson dictum). The en banc circuit court in Isaac shifted to the "cause" analysis described
in the text, leaving the panel's approach to one side. In the Supreme Court, Justice
O'Connor revived the argument in a footnote and dashed it summarily with a citation
to Hankerson, 456 U.S. at 134 n.43. See Oral Argument Transcript at 7, Isaac (argument
of Mr. Karas) (relying heavily on Hankerson at the outset of his argument). On first blush,
one might assume that Hankerson's invitation to circumvent the effect of retrospective decisions has hardened into settled practice. If that is the case, then defense attorneys will
be required to foresee changes in the law, and, when they do not, their clients will suffer
the consequences. I think, though, that it is still too early to tell. Justice O'Connor's embrasure of Hankerson is measured: "In this case we accept the force of [the Hankerson footnote] as applied to defendants tried after Winship," 456 U.S. at 134 n.43 (emphasis added).
It seems, accordingly, that the adoption is less than complete. She does here what she
does elsewhere in the opinion: she decides the case at bar and none other. Add to that
her holding in Isaac that the federal claim against the Ohio jury instruction did exist at
the time of trial, and Justice O'Connor's treatment of the Hankerson dictum holds even
less predictive value.
243. Of course, if counsel's action or inaction constituted ineffective assistance in the
sixth amendment sense, it makes no difference whether the defendant knew of and
acquiesced in counsel's default. See Mullins v. Evans, 622 F.2d 504, 506 (10th Cir. 1980).
244. See United States ex rel. Edwards v. Warden, 676 F.2d 254, 258 (7th Cir. 1982)
(finding no "cause" when defense counsel not only failed to object to prosecution's use
of defendant's postarrest actions but actually pursued the matter affirmatively, making
that evidence part of the strategic defense). Accord United States ex rel. Abdus-Sabur v.
Cuyler, 653 F.2d 828, 835-36 (3d Cir. 1981); Graham v. Mabry, 645 F.2d 603, 606 (8th
Cir. 1981); Goldman v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1980).
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failing to assert the claim in season. 245 Defaults of that kind, too, are
strategic in the narrow sense that they are committed to protect the client
in some fashion. They are, however, quite different in character. It is
one thing to make an applicant live with ordinary, tactical choices even
when they do not accomplish the objectives counsel had intended. It is
quite another to force a petitioner to pay the price for public and institudispassionately, without
tional unwillingness to consider federal claims
246
penalizing the individual for asserting them.

The Reagan Administration's bill scarcely acknowledges the caseby-case evolution of "cause" preferred by the Supreme Court and the
necessary relation between that concept and the capacity of defense counsel
to bind the client to trial-level procedural default. In place of all that has
gone before, the proposed new subsection (d) would establish a rigid, threepart, statutory definition of "cause." 247 While it seems plain that "cause"
should be found in each of the three circumstances described, it is equally
plain that the Court itself would find "cause" in other situations as well.
It is plainer still that "cause" should be found in other circumstances and
should not be limited to what appears in the proposed amendment to section 2244.
To begin, none of the three circumstances set forth as "cause" in
the bill even mentions mistakes committed by counsel. The Justice Department's commentary recognizes that questions relating to "cause" have
arisen "most frequently" in cases in which procedural default resulted
from counsel's "error or misjudgment" falling short of ineffective
assistance. 248 While the249commentary concedes that courts have found

"cause" in such cases,
it takes the bald position that those cases are
wrong and that "cause" should be found only when the prisoner can
demonstrate an independent violation of the sixth amendment. 250 Once
agreement is reached on that remarkable proposition, subsection (1) of
the proposed amendment swings into play. Ineffective assistance of counsel
and on that
translates into "state action in violation of the Constitution,"
25 1
ground "cause" is established under the bill.
245. See Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727, 744 (5th Cir. 1981) (recalling that in Noia the
petitioner's decision to forego appeal was intentional but nonetheless was made in circumstances justifying collateral review); Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 443, 446 (4th
Cir. 1978) (declining to invoke Sykes because counsel's intentional default was grounded
in fear that an objection might enflame jury). The best citation for the point is Whitus
v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964), in which counsel
intentionally withheld an objection to racial discrimination in the selection of the jury
in circumstances in which it was clear that such an objection would have elicited harsh
treatment for the client. Id. at 509-10.
246. L. YACKLE, supra note 6, § 86, at 94 (Supp. 1982).
247. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
248. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 64 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of

Justice).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 65. Not everyone is confident that the language the Administration pro-
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No attempt is made in the commentary to explain or justify the Administration's position. That is not surprising. The position is without foundation. As the prisoners in Isaac argued in their briefs, ineffective assistance
of counsel tied to the procedural default in issue is a sufficient, but hardly
a necessary, predicate for "cause." If it were otherwise-if habeas petitioners were required to establish ineffective assistance in every case before
being permitted to litigate underlying federal claims-there would be no
advantage in most instances in pursuing those claims. Habeas relief would
be forthcoming on the independent sixth amendment ground standing
alone. The Court simply has not erected the elaborate framework described
in Noia and Sykes for contending with abortive state proceedings only to
short-circuit it into a search for substantive violations of the sixth amendment. Nor, to be sure, has the Court suggested that in this context it will
vary its ordinary sixth amendment analysis and force prisoners to establish
ineffective assistance based on isolated instances of alleged attorney error.
While a single failure to raise a federal claim in a timely and proper manner may on occasion constitute ineffective assistance and, of course,
"cause," in most instances the courts must and will look further before
252
coming to a conclusion.
Beyond defense counsel error found to violate the sixth amendment,
the Reagan Administration's proposed subsection (1) extends to other forms
of "state action" in violation of federal law. The commentary explains
that the bill's objective is to recognize "cause" whenever the state failed
to accord the petitioner an opportunity to litigate a federal claim "consistent with the requirements of federal law.' '253 If, in other words, the state
procedure was itself unconstitutional, the prisoner's opportunity to litigate
in state court was insufficient and "cause" should be found for the procedural default that occurred. The best that can be said for this proposed
definition of "cause" is that it may represent an unintended revival of
the adequate-state-ground doctrine, ostensibly read out of habeas corpus
law by its omission from the Administration's bill. As indicated earlier,
however, that doctrine, as it is currently understood, is not limited to state
procedural grounds that are themselves unconstitutional. 254 In any event,
poses would be read this way. If, for example, the "state action" term were given the
reading it receives in ordinary fourteenth amendment cases, some difficulty might arise.
In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Court held that even a public
defender does not act "under color of state law" in performing ordinary defense counsel
duties. Id. at 321. Additionally, in Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982),
the Court intimated that "state action" would have been identified in Polk only if the
prisoner had challenged a "rule of conduct or decision for which the state was responsible." Id. at 2753-54 n.18. Cf Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (refusing to
distinguish retained lawyers from assigned counsel in defining the constitutional standard
against which trial counsel's performance will be judged).
252. See notes 236-38 supra.
253. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 65 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of
Justice).
254. See note 145 supra.
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subsection (1) bespeaks a grudging attitude regarding the circumstances
that justify a failure to raise federal claims in state court. To concede that
prisoners' defaults may be overlooked when the state courts unconstitutionally frustrate litigation in the state forum is to concede very little.
Proposed subsections (2) and (3) would recognize "cause" if, at the
time of the default, the federal claim was "not recognized" or its "factual predicate" could not have been discovered "through the exercise of
reasonable diligence.' 255 The commentary explains that proposed subsection (1) might not cover these situations, because it is not always clear
that state proceedings conducted before the establishment of a "new"
federal right or the discovery of evidence supporting some more familiar
claim are, for those reasons, unconstitutional. 256 These two bases for
"cause" are, however, the "clearest justification for a procedural default"
and, accordingly, are set forth independently. 257 Once again, I would hardly
contend that "cause" should not be found in these circumstances. Notwithstanding the related ferment in Isaac, I quite agree that habeas petitioners should not forfeit the opportunity to litigate federal claims of which
they could not have been aware at the time of trial.2 58 While the precise
language used in the bill may create interpretation difficulties, 259 the objec255. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
256. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 66 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of

Justice).
257. Reform Act, supra note 17, at 66 (section-by-section analysis of U.S. Dep't of
Justice).
258. See generally L. YACKLE, supra note 6, §§ 85, 86 (Supp. 1982).
259. Subsection (2) is a case in point. The Administration's original proposal, set forth
in S. 2216, would permit "cause" to be found if the federal right asserted by the petitioner "was not recognized prior to the procedural default." S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 2 (1982), reprinted in Reform Act, supra note 17, at 9, 9-10. Later versions provide
that a claim must have been "recognized" by the Supreme Court. S. 217, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983); S. 2903, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). While that might provide a more
workable standard, it would exclude a host of legitimate contentions that had been made
in other forums, perhaps successfully, but for some reason had not been embraced by
the Supreme Court itself. Given the Administration's apparent desire to foreclose habeas
claims when possible, I doubt the draftsmen have thought that idea through. Cf. note
22 supra.
If more recent versions of the Administration's position offer a slight improvement over
S. 2216 regarding what claims may be deemed to be "recognized," they must be found
wanting in another, perhaps more significant respect. Like another recent bill, S. 653,
97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981), S. 217 and S. 2903 would permit "cause" to be found only
if the newly recognized claim is "retroactively applicable." The original recommendation of the Attorney General's Task Force would have adopted similar language. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 58 (1981). That kind
of restriction amounts to a "Catch-22". For it is only through the exercise of habeas corpus review that the federal courts can often determine whether a "new" constitutional
principle is to have retrospective effect. Professor Mishkin has made the point: "[T]he
potential availability of collateral attack is what created the 'retroactivity' problem...
in the first place. . . ." Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Terr-Foreword: The High Court,
the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 77-78 (1965).
If habeas were not available, and certainly if the federal courts were not prepared to apply
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tives are clear enough and salutary. 260 My quarrel, here as elsewhere,
is that the Reagan Administration is extraordinarily miserly in establishing
exceptions to what is ultimately revealed as the very kind of "airtight system
261
of forfeitures" that the Court itself has consistently eschewed.
III.

CONCLUSION

I have tried in this Article to look closely at the Reagan Administration's habeas corpus proposals, to match them against the existing system
of postconviction review as it is described in the relevant provisions of
the Judicial Code and Supreme Court decisions, and thus to demonstrate
that enactment of the Administration's program would have a devastating
impact on the American criminal justice system. Leaving comparatively
less serious matters to one side, 262 I have concentrated on the proposals
to import the "process model" into habeas corpus review of legal questions determined in state court, to force the federal courts to defer in most
instances to state court determinations of fact, and to foreclose habeas
review entirely because of prisoners' procedural default in state proceedings.
In each instance, acceptance of the Administration's positions would mean
fundamental changes in the present framework. The burden of persuasion regarding the wisdom of such a momentous and dangerous restrucpresent law to cases that come before them, there would be no occasion for deciding whether
new decisions have retroactive application and none for giving them that effect in run
of the mill cases. The premise that the retrospective application of a claim can be known
without resort to habeas corpus review to determine that very question is open to serious
doubt. But see Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) (illustrating that in rare cases
a new federal claim may be established after conviction but before the completion of direct
review-permitting the retroactivity question to be treated on appeal).
260. In point of fact, I would venture that if a "change in the law" exception were
not recognized in this context, the Supreme Court's substantive analysis of "retroactivity" questions would be fundamentally undermined. Some observers have argued that
the retrospective application of new decisions should be determined indirectly by reference
to the scope of habeas corpus review. See generally Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 TermForeword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 56 (1965). This issue was also addressed in Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 459,
460 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 702 n.9
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 268 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Retroactive effect could thus be denied simply by refusing to
apply present law in habeas corpus and instead judging the merit of habeas claims by
the law as it was understood at the time of the petitioner's conviction. The Supreme Court
has resisted that approach and established instead a three-prong test for determining, as
a substantive matter, whether a new decision is to be applied retrospectively. See Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). Habeas has often been the procedural vehicle for
making the determination on that analysis in the first instance and, if a new decision
is determined to be retroactive, applying it to older cases. In a real sense, a refusal to
find "cause" when the law has changed would subvert the Court's approach and embrace
in its place the very analysis that the Justices have regularly rejected. But see Hankerson
v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 244 n.8 (1977), discussed in note 242 supra.
261. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 432 (1963).
262. See notes 22, 70, 118, 120 supra.
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turing of existing arrangements rests with the proponents. On reflection,
their case is due the mathematician's assessment: "not proved." Certainly,
the program cannot be justified on the theory that it would only embrace
innovations already made by the Court itself. The Administration's proposals enjoy precious little support in the Court's recent cases.
The explanation for the Administration's assault on the postconviction writ resides deep within an ideological tradition that subordinates
the long-standing function of the federal courts in the enforcement of constitutional safeguards to values touching federalism and the finality of
criminal judgments. The Administration's proposals to "reform" habeas
corpus do not challenge the substantive scope of constitutional guarantees,
but do pose an indirect threat. The Administration would dismantle, to
a large extent, the federal machinery now in place for the federal effectuation of the Bill of Rights and its analogue, the fourteenth amendment.
That course of action is palatable only if one is convinced, as I am not,
that constitutional safeguards can and will be enforced in the state courts
alone, without the backstop of collateral review in federal habeas corpus.
It just isn't so.

